The Wage Penalty for Married Women of Career Interruptions: Evidence from the 1970s and the 1990s

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to assess how the wage penalty for career interruptions by married women changed between the 1970s and the 1990s. We estimate the wage penalty for career interruptions using the work‐history model and PSID data. We use several approaches to control for various forms of endogeneity and selection bias. Our empirical results suggest that (i) the wage penalty for married women's career interruptions increased from 40.4% to 73.7% over the period, (ii) the ratio of the wage penalty for married women to that of married men also increased, from 1.33 to 2.43, (iii) Blinder–Oaxaca decompositions show that changes in education‐ or occupation‐specific wage penalties account for most of the wage penalty increase.

Concentration of Innovation Investments Along the Business Cycle

“…The empirical analysis in this paper relies on Wooldridge (1995), see Jones et al (2020) for an application to the estimation of the wage equation in the presence of labor participation interruptions. We follow Wooldridge (1995) to estimate a model where selection is on the decision of whether or not to invest in innovation.…”

“…We follow Wooldridge (1995) to estimate a model where selection is on the decision of whether or not to invest in innovation. Using the notation in Jones et al (2020), the main equation to be estimated is where x 1it is observed for all firms, whereas x 2it is observed only for those firms that invest in innovation. The selection equation that determines whether y it is observed is therefore where z it includes x 1it and z 2it , observed for all firms.…”