The Wage Distribution in a Model of the Assignment of Skills to Jobs

Teulings, Coen N.

doi:10.1086/261984

Cited by 144 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The proof is an extension of arguments provided in Teulings (1995). Hence, I provide a heuristic proof only.…”

Section: O[7]mentioning

confidence: 92%

“…This paper follows a new approach on this issue. The theory of substitution between worker types is linked to another strand in the literature, that of the assignment models (see Tinbergen 1956;Rosen 1974;Sattinger 1975;426 journal of political economy Heckman and Sedlacek 1985;Teulings 1995). In these models, both labor supply and demand are heterogeneous.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital

Teulings

2005

Journal of Political Economy

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“…The proof is an extension of arguments provided in Teulings (1995). Hence, I provide a heuristic proof only.…”

Section: O[7]mentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital

Teulings

2005

Journal of Political Economy

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“…11 Assignment models may be useful in this regard (see, e.g., Sattinger 1975Sattinger , 1993Teulings 1995), but have so far proved difficult to combine with the ORU-type model specification (see Hartog 2000: 140f). Notes: Formal on-the-job training is number of days during last 12 months spent in employer provided education, Informal OJT is number of months needed in job before carrying out tasks 'reasonably well', Opportunity to learn new things on the job is a scale 1-5, Prospects for advancement in current job is a scale 0-2, where 2 is good prospects both within and outside current firm and 0 is neither, while job satisfaction is a scale 1-5.…”

Section: Models 1 To 3 Of Tablementioning

confidence: 99%

Educational mismatch, wages, and wage growth: Overeducation in Sweden, 1974–2000

2009

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We examine the impact of educational mismatch on wages and wage growth in Sweden.The empirical analyses, based on cross-sectional and panel data from the Level of living surveys 1974-2000, are guided by two main hypotheses: (a) that educational mismatch reflects human capital compensation rather than real mismatch, and (b) that educational mismatch is real but dissolves with time spent in the labour market, so that its impact on wages tends toward zero over a typical worker's career. Our findings do not support these hypotheses. First, significant differences in contemporaneous economic returns to education across match categories remain even after variations in ability are taken into account. Second, we find no evidence that the rate of wage growth is higher among overeducated workers than others. Our conclusion is that the overeducated are penalized early on by an inferior rate of return to schooling from which they do not recover.

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“…The analysis is even harder when utility is not transferable, because the marginal utility of the job characteristic depends on the wage. The established results (Teulings 1995, Shimer 2005 in the optimal assignment literature for heterogeneous jobs and workers do not answer this question, because job characteristics do not affect the utility of a worker 2 , and hence, double transactions do not exist in those models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compensating wage differentials in stable job matching equilibrium

Han

Yamaguchi

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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This paper studies implicit pricing of non-wage job characteristics in the labor market using a two-sided matching model. It departs from the previous literature by allowing worker heterogeneity in productivity, which gives rise to a double transaction problem in a hedonic model. Deriving sufficient conditions under which assortative matching is the unique stable job-worker matching, we show that observed wage differentials between jobs reflect not only compensating wage differentials, but also worker productivity gaps between the jobs. We find that the job-worker matching pattern determines the extent to which compensating wage differentials are confounded with the worker productivity gap effect.

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The Wage Distribution in a Model of the Assignment of Skills to Jobs

Cited by 144 publications

References 19 publications

Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital

Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages, and the Accumulation of Human Capital

Educational mismatch, wages, and wage growth: Overeducation in Sweden, 1974–2000

Compensating wage differentials in stable job matching equilibrium

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