The literature on territorial lobbying in the European Union (EU) has paid much attention to the interaction between regional representations in Brussels and the member-state central governments, and the relations of these representations with the European institutions. Surprisingly, far less systematic research has been conducted on the policies that regional representations prioritize when they lobby in Brussels. In this article, we focus on the policy portfolios of these organizations and analyze variation concerning the domains and issues these regional representations prioritize. Empirically, we demonstrate that the size and the nature of a policy portfolio is not primarily affected by the capabilities of a regional representation, but rather results from structural ties of regional lobbyists with other public and private interests. This claim is corroborated by data collected through a telephone survey with 127 officials from regional offices and trans-regional associations.Regional authorities, that is sub-state jurisdictions such as provinces, counties, regions and länder, mobilize in large numbers in the European Union (EU), often by establishing a permanent representation in Brussels (Donas and Beyers, 2013a). Following Swenden et al (2006, p. 864) we denote these actors as regions, which are meso-level jurisdictions situated between local units of government (such as municipalities) and the central government. The Brussels-based representations of these entities act as communication channels between the region and the European institutions. They monitor policy developments in Brussels, functioning as a kind of