The Variable Geometry of the Euro-Crisis: A Look at the Non-Euro Area Member States

Abstract

I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy www.eui.eu cadmus.eui.eu Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law This paper was first delivered at a conference held at the European University Institute in October 2014 presenting some initial results of the project on Constitutional Change through Euro Crisis Law. This project is a study of the impact of Euro Crisis Law (by which is meant the legal instruments adopted at European or international level in reaction to the Eurozone crisis) on the national legal and constitutional structures of the 28 Member States of the European Union with the aim of investigating the impact of Euro Crisis law on the constitutional balance of powers and the protection of fundamental and social rights at national level. An open-access research tool (eurocrisislaw.eui.eu) has been created, based on a set of reports for each Member State, that constitutes an excellent resource for further, especially comparative, studies of the legal status and implementation of Euro Crisis law at national level, the interactions between national legal systems and Euro Crisis law and the constitutional challenges that have been faced. The project is based at the EUI Law Department and is funded by the EUI Research Council (2013-2015).

National central banks in EMU: time for revision?

“…Outside of the tasks of the ESCB, the NCBs may also fulfill other tasks, based on national law. 6 All NCBs in the EU are part of the ESCB, even those of MS who do not take part in the euro [6]. The NCBs of non-euro MS (non-participating NCBs) are then exempted from many of the obligations under the Maastricht Treaty, according to art.…”

“…5 See, however, the argument developed by Langner [46]. 6 During the euro-crisis, a controversy also arose about the holding by NCBs of significant amounts of assets and liabilities outside their ESCB tasks. In 2016, the Agreement on Net Financial Assets (ANFA) was published.…”

“…As discussed above, in 2003 Sweden decided after a referendum not to try to join the euro and no enforcement action has since been taken by the Commission. That created the de facto situation where MS with a derogation are free to decide whether they want to try to join the euro [6]. It should then be recognized that those MS are also free to decide upon the level of independence for their central bank.…”