The Values of Semantics

Zimmermann, Thomas Ede

doi:10.1524/9783050085555.383

Cited by 5 publications

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“…) for convincing me that accidental double lives of semantic values should be defi ned away in precisely this fashion, thereby paving the way to a more principled account of semantic values than the one originally envisaged in Zimmermann (2006). 6 This is what happens in multi-dimensional theories; cf.…”

Section: Defi Nitionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Equivalence of Semantic Theories

Zimmermann¹

2012

Prospects for Meaning

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The paper develops a criterion of equivalence between (compositional) semantic theories: two theories are equivalent if they are isomorphic and if they agree on the interpretation of the values they assign to the expressions of a given language. The criterion is illustrated by applications to (simplifi ed versions of ) contemporary theories of linguistic semantics, thereby shedding light on the relation between semantic values and linguistic meanings.

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Section: Defi Nitionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The second and third criterion correspond to sameness of internal and external rôles of semantic values in the sense ofZimmermann (2006). Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/24/16 8:16 PM…”

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confidence: 99%

Equivalence of Semantic Theories

Zimmermann¹

2012

Prospects for Meaning

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“…It may seem that Prior's puzzle even has instances that arise outside of verbal complements. Moltmann [2003] and Zimmermann [2006b] discuss what appear to be instances of Prior's puzzle that arise in subject position, as in 13. Moltmann [2003Moltmann [ , 2004Moltmann [ , 2008] calls quantifiers such as the ones in (13)-( 24) "special quantifiers".…”

Section: Generalization To Other Grammatical Positionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first casualties of the generalized puzzle are views such as those endorsed by Zimmermann [2006b], Grzankowski [2018], and Nebel [2019], on which the invalidity of nominal substitution is explained by the fact that nominal substituends denote different things than the expressions they replace. First, consider Nebel's view.…”

Section: Criticism Of Existing Proposalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prior's puzzle generalized

D’Ambrosio

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Prior's puzzle is standardly taken to be the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs is invalid. I show that Prior's puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily supposed. There are two variants on the substitutional form of the puzzle-a quantificational variant and a pronominal variant-and all three forms of the puzzle arise in a wide range of verbal complements, rather than merely in the complements of propositional attitude verbs. The generalized puzzle shows that a range of proposed solutions to the original puzzle fail, or are radically incomplete, and also reveals the connections between Prior's puzzle and debates over the nature of semantic types and higher-order quantification. I go on to develop a novel, higher-order solution to the generalized form of the puzzle, and I argue that this higher-approach is superior to its first-order alternatives. • Justin D'Ambrosio(1) a. Sally fears that Fido bites.b. Sally fears the proposition that Fido bites.The standard theory tells us that "that fido bites" refers to a proposition. It also seems clear that "the proposition that Fido bites" refers to a proposition-indeed, the very same proposition. And yet (1-a) can be true while (1-b) is false-Sally does not fear an abstract object. We may call this Prior's puzzle, after Arthur Prior [1971, p. 16], who first formulated it.This paper first shows that Prior's puzzle is not just a puzzle concerning substitutions such as the one above. Rather, the failure of such substitutions to preserve truth is a special case of a puzzle that is much more general along two dimensions. First, the substitutional puzzle has both quantificational and pronominal variants that have the same source and warrant the same solution as the original form. Thus, Prior's puzzle has nothing specifically to do with substitution. Second, all three of these forms of the puzzle arise in the complements of all kinds of verbs. Thus, Prior's puzzle has nothing specifically to do with that-clauses or propositional attitude verbs.This generalization has several important consequences. First, the generalized puzzle shows that a wide range of proposed solutions to Prior's puzzle fail, or are radically incomplete. Many such proposals apply only to the substitutional puzzle, and cannot be generalized to its quantificational or pronominal variants. Other proposals apply only to the case of propositional attitudes, but cannot be extended to solve the puzzle as it arises in other verbal complements.Still other views fail in both of these ways.Second, this generalization reveals the way in which Prior's puzzle is deeply intertwined with debates over the nature of semantic types and the status of higher-order quantification. In particular, one's approach to solving the generalized form of Prior's puzzle is determined by, and also reveals, one's views on two questions that are fundamental to semantic theorizing: whether...

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“…This generalization shows that a wide range of proposed solutions to Prior's puzzle are either radically incomplete, or fail altogether. 19 First, consider views such as those endorsed by Zimmermann [2006b], Grzankowski [2018], and Nebel [2019], on which the invalidity of nominal substitution is explained by the fact that nominal substituends denote different things than the expressions they replace. For example, on Zimmermann's [2006b] view, "a unicorn", as it occurs in the complement of an intensional transitive verb, denotes the property of being a unicorn, while "the property of being a unicorn" denotes a distinct, higher-order property.…”

Section: (17)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior's puzzle

D’Ambrosio

2020

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Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and at other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's puzzle is much more general than is ordinarily appreciated, and Ramsification requires a solution to the generalized form of Prior's puzzle. Without such a solution, a wide range of theories will either fail to imply their Ramsey sentences, or have Ramsey sentences that are ill-formed. As a consequence, definitions of theoretical terms given using the Ramsey sentence will be either incorrect or nonsensical. I present a partial solution to the puzzle that requires making use of a neo-Davidsonian language for scientific theorizing, but the would-be Ramsifier still faces serious challenges.

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The Values of Semantics

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Equivalence of Semantic Theories

Equivalence of Semantic Theories

Prior's puzzle generalized

Ramsification and the ramifications of Prior's puzzle

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