The value of virtual worlds and entities : a philosophical analysis of virtual worlds and their potential impact on well-being

Brey, Philip A.E.; Soraker, Johnny

doi:10.3990/1.9789036530101

Cited by 7 publications

(27 citation statements)

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“…For example, a crate is lifted or a zombie is killed. Such effects within the virtual realm are called intravirtual effects by Søraker (2010). A virtual action is defined over virtual objects and intravirtual effects should not be understood as really occurring.…”

Section: The Ontology Of Virtual Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Physical and Social Reality of Virtual Worlds

Brey

2013

Oxford Handbooks Online

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Section: The Ontology Of Virtual Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Physical and Social Reality of Virtual Worlds

Brey

2013

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…The taxonomy of virtuality suggested by Søraker (2010) identifies the following types (p. 56): virtual reality "a three-dimensional interactive computer generated environment that incorporates a first-person perspective" (Brey, 1999); multi-access virtual reality; virtual worlds; virtual environments; virtual communities and virtual institutions (banks, libraries, universities, museums, galleries, experiments, enterprises, businesses). Yet another way to delineate virtuality is through the Journal of Virtual Worlds Research, which features such phenomena as cultures of virtual worlds, pedagogy, education and innovation in virtual worlds, virtual worlds for health and healthcare, technology, economy and standards in virtual worlds, virtual economies, virtual goods and service delivery in virtual worlds, and consumer behaviour in virtual worlds, among others.…”

Section: What Is a Virtual World? The Nature Of Virtualitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How can they be developed in order to contribute to the well being of humanity? Søraker (2010) discusses the ideals of good and theories of value and well-being to finally focus the analysis on subjective well-being, emphasizing the importance of normative evaluations of technology. Those are undoubtedly central questions, especially when addressing virtual worlds used in social networking and games.…”

Section: Question the Ways "The Changing Nature Of New Artefacts Is Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive revolution, virtuality and good life

Dodig-Crnković

2012

AI & Soc

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We are living in an era in which the focus of human relationships with the world is shifting from performing and physical to controlling and cognitive/informational interactions. This emerging, increasingly informational world is our new ecology, an infosphere that presents the grounds for a cognitive revolution based on interactions in networks of biological and artificial, intelligent agents. After the industrial revolution, which extended the human body through mechanical machinery, the cognitive revolution extends the human mind/cognition through information processing machinery. These novel circumstances come with new qualities and preferences demanding new conceptualizations. We have some work ahead of us to establish value systems and practices extended from the real to the virtual or info-computational. This paper first presents a current view of the virtual versus the actual, and then offers an interpretation framework based on an info-computational understanding of cognition in which agency implies computational processing of informational structures of the world as an infosphere. Here the concept of agency implies the ability to act on one's own behalf. An agent is hence an autonomous decision-making entity. The notion of "good life" is discussed in light of different ideals of well-being in the infosphere, connecting virtuality as a space of potential and alternative worlds for an agent for whom the reality is a space of actual experiences, in the sense of Deleuze. Even though info-computational framework enables us to see both the real world and diversity of virtual worlds in terms of computational processes on informational structures, based on a distinct layered cognitive architecture of all physical agents there is clear difference between potential worlds of the virtual and actual agent's experiences made in the real. The conclusion is that by cocooning ourselves in an elaborate info-computational infrastructure of the virtual we may be increasingly isolating ourselves from the reality of direct experience of the world. The biggest challenges of the cognitive revolution may be ethical, not technological; they are about the nature of being human and its values. This article points to some of the challenges of cognitive revolution, as understood within infocomputational framework.

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“…3 Indeed, this seems to be the general concern that lies behind criticism of virtual friendship; that they are somehow inauthentic hence not the kind that will provide us with genuine happiness. Although I have argued elsewhere that happiness should be regarded as a subjective mental state (Søraker 2010b), my more modest claim for this paper is that it is often essential to understand how something affects our subjective mental state of well-being if we want to investigate whether we ought to do something or not. It is important to note that this does not entail that we should always do whatever it is that we believe will make us happy.…”

Section: The Role Of Subjective Well-being In Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How shall i compare thee? Comparing the prudential value of actual virtual friendship

Soraker

2012

Ethics Inf Technol

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It has become commonplace to hold the view that virtual surrogates for the things that are good in life are inferior to their actual, authentic counterparts, including virtual education, virtual skill-demanding activities and virtual acts of creativity. Virtual friendship has also been argued to be inferior to traditional, embodied forms of friendship. Coupled with the view that virtual friendships threaten to replace actual ones, the conclusion is often made that we ought to concentrate our efforts on actual friendships rather than settle for virtual replacements. The purpose of this paper is to offer a balanced and empirically grounded analysis of the relative prudential value of actual and virtual friendship. That is, do actual and virtual friendships differ when it comes to enhancing our subjective well-being? In doing so, I will discuss a number of presuppositions that lie behind common criticisms of virtual friendship. This will include, among other considerations, their potential for replacing actual friendship, as well as the possibility for self-disclosure, trust, sharing and dynamic spread of happiness in virtual worlds. The purpose is not to arrive at a firm, normative conclusion, but rather to introduce a number of considerations that we should take into account in our individual deliberations over which role virtual friendships ought to have in our unique life situations.

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The value of virtual worlds and entities : a philosophical analysis of virtual worlds and their potential impact on well-being

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

The Physical and Social Reality of Virtual Worlds

The Physical and Social Reality of Virtual Worlds

Cognitive revolution, virtuality and good life

How shall i compare thee? Comparing the prudential value of actual virtual friendship

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