The value of transparency in multidivisional firms

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study internal incentives, transparency and firm performance in multidivisional organizations. Two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives, and decide whether to publicly disclose their performances. In each division a risk-neutral principal deals with a risk-averse (exclusive) agent under moral hazard. Each agent exerts an unverifiable effort that creates a spillover on the effort cost of the other agent. We first study the determinants of the optimal principal-agent contract with and without performance transparency. Then, we show how effort spillovers affect the equilibrium communication behavior of each division. Both principals commit to disclose the performance of their agents in equilibrium when efforts are complements, while no communication is the only equilibrium outcome when efforts are substitutes.JEL codes: D43, D82, L14.

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