The Value of Majority Status: The Effect of Jeffords's Switch on Asset Prices of Republican and Democratic Firms

Hartog, Chris Den; Monroe, Nathan W.

doi:10.3162/036298008783743291

Cited by 29 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Thus, the majority party is thought to lack the necessary control over the agenda to significantly alter outcomes in its own favor (Davidson 1985;Sinclair 1989;Smith and Gamm 2001). In contrast to this conventional wisdom, recent work argues that Senate majorities do exercise authority within the chamber (Campbell, Cox, and McCubbins 2002;Den Hartog and Monroe 2008;Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). Nonetheless, as Gailmard and Jenkins (2007) point out, "the coalescing theoretical agreement is that majority party .…”

Section: The Majority Partymentioning

confidence: 99%

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Lazarus

Steigerwalt

2009

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization.

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Section: The Majority Partymentioning

confidence: 99%

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Lazarus

Steigerwalt

2009

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…2 Scholars have made less progress in the identification of internal factors affecting congressional partisanship, particularly in the Senate. The majority party's procedural control over the legislative agenda has received much attention (Bach and Smith 1988;McCubbins 1993, 2005;Den Hartog and Monroe 2008;Theriault 2006), but the Senate majority party lacks procedural and institutional resources equivalent to those in the House of Representatives (Sinclair 2000;Smith 2007). Similarly, the Senate is never reapportioned, so redistricting could not have had any effect on Senate partisanship.…”

Section: External Versus Internal Factors Driving Partisan Divergencementioning

confidence: 99%

Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Content and Senate Partisanship, 1981–2004

Lee

2008

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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This article presents evidence that the recent increase in partisanship in Senate roll‐call voting is partly due to changes in the content of the Senate agenda. The analysis draws on an original dataset classifying Senate roll‐call votes from 1981 to 2004 according to substantive issue content. Over the past two decades, the types of issues that were most divisive along partisan lines in earlier periods became progressively more prominent on the Senate roll‐call agenda. Even when one controls for the effects of other electoral and institutional factors, one finds that the shifting agenda notably contributed to the rise in Senate partisanship.

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“…Similar to (Hartog and Monroe, 2004), we exploit the party switch made by Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont and the resulting change in majority control of the Senate during the 107th Congress as a quasi-experimental design. In short, Jeffords announced his switch on May 24, 2001 from Republican to Independent status, effective June 6, 2001.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tracking the dynamic evolution of participant salience in a discussion

Hassan

Fader

Crespin³

et al. 2008

Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Computational Linguistics - COLING '08

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We introduce a technique for analyzing the temporal evolution of the salience of participants in a discussion. Our method can dynamically track how the relative importance of speakers evolve over time using graph based techniques. Speaker salience is computed based on the eigenvector centrality in a graph representation of participants in a discussion. Two participants in a discussion are linked with an edge if they use similar rhetoric. The method is dynamic in the sense that the graph evolves over time to capture the evolution inherent to the participants salience. We used our method to track the salience of members of the US Senate using data from the US Congressional Record. Our analysis investigated how the salience of speakers changes over time. Our results show that the scores can capture speaker centrality in topics as well as events that result in change of salience or influence among different participants.

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The Value of Majority Status: The Effect of Jeffords's Switch on Asset Prices of Republican and Democratic Firms

Cited by 29 publications

References 33 publications

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Different Houses: The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House and Senate

Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Content and Senate Partisanship, 1981–2004

Tracking the dynamic evolution of participant salience in a discussion

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