The value of active politicians on supervisory boards: evidence from the Berlin stock exchange and the parliament in interwar Germany

Lehmann‐Hasemeyer, Sibylle; Opitz, Alexander

doi:10.1080/03585522.2018.1533882

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…In the case of Germany, Ferguson and Voth (2008) find a strong correlation between German firms’ positive returns and political connections with the Nazi Party after the elections of 1933. However, Lehman-Hasemeyer and Opitz (2017) find little evidence of a positive impact of political connections on firm performance after the general elections of 1924 and 1928 during the Weimar Republic. In turn, Lehman-Hasemeyer et al (2014) show that investors reacted negatively to the democratisation of Saxony's electoral rules in 1896 and 1909 (which increased the political influence of Social Democrats in the regional government), which negatively affected Saxon firms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.…”

Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

Political connections and stock returns: evidence from the Boulangist campaign, 1888–1889

Ortiz-Serrano

2018

Financial History Review

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The decade of the 1880s was a turbulent period for the French Third Republic. Corruption scandals that discredited republican parties and a lacklustre economic performance after the Paris Bourse crash of 1882 gave rise to widespread public disenchantment with the republican political elites. The rise of the Boulangist movement was the most representative example of this disillusionment. In 1887, Georges Boulanger, an army general and former minister of war, began orchestrating a populist mass campaign against the ruling republicans and the parliamentary regime. His political agitation, supported by a heterogeneous coalition of socialists, radicals and royalists, reached a climax in January 1889, when, after winning a Paris by-election, he had an opportunity to stage acoup d’état, which did not materialise. To understand whether French investors perceived the Boulangist campaign as a real threat to their interests, I use an original dataset of daily stock prices to analyse the effect of the January 1889 by-election on the value of politically connected firms listed on the Paris Bourse. The results show that firms with links to the republican parties experienced positive cumulative abnormal returns after Boulanger's refusal to stage the coup, while there was no effect on firms connected to the royalist parties or with no political ties. These findings suggest that French investors reacted positively to the prospective subsiding of the Boulangist movement.

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Section: IImentioning

confidence: 99%

Political connections and stock returns: evidence from the Boulangist campaign, 1888–1889

Ortiz-Serrano

2018

Financial History Review

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“…It is worth noting that the insights gleaned from the main effect of our analysis are not unique to China. Politicians often confer benefits to connected firms across various institutional settings, with rich empirical evidence derived from countries ranging from liberal market economies such as the United States (Brogaard & Duchin,2017;Goldman et al, 2013), coordinated market economies such as Germany (Ferguson & Voth, 2008;Lehmann-Hasemeyer & Opitz, 2019), to other transition economies such as Russia (Trifonov, 2021;Klarin & Sharmelly, 2021).…”

Section: Managerial Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The innovation paradox of TMT political capital in transition economy firms

Xia

Liu

2022

Journal of Business Research

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“…They do not specifically refer to the fact that large joint-stock banks were controlled by a small group of wealthy shareholders and banks. Moreover, recent papers have further emphasised that some of the shareholders were often well-connected and influential (Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Opitz 2019). Perhaps this particular feature of the German stock market gave the joint-stock firms an advantage because the wealthy governed them very well.…”

Section: VIImentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Table 6 we look at the institutional investors in more detail to get a better idea of their profile. Here, we divide the investors into different industries, following Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Opitz (2019). 26 The highest percentage (52.06) of institutional investors comes from the banking sector, which is surely driven by the proxy voting.…”

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confidence: 99%

The limits of control: corporate ownership and control of German joint-stock firms, 1869–1945

Lehmann‐Hasemeyer

Neumayer

2022

Financial History Review

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We study the social structure of ownership of German joint-stock firms covering the period 1869 to 1945 based on a random sample of attendance lists of general meetings. We confirm previous research findings based on smaller samples that despite several changes in the economic and political environment, the majority of shares of the attendees of the general meetings remained firmly in the hands of a few male and mostly inside investors. Moreover, we closely investigate the socio-economic characteristics of the shareholders. We do occasionally find investors from lower social classes and women, but their share of votes was negligible. Adding to the discussion of whether banks strongly monitored and controlled German industrial firms, we aim to track their impact at the meetings. In about 30 per cent of the meetings, a banker or bank was the most influential shareholder and in more than 50 per cent of the meetings a banker or bank was among the three largest shareholders, remarkably without necessarily owning the shares themselves. Although we cannot evaluate whether the banks used this power to pursue their targets, they certainly were in a position to do so.

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The value of active politicians on supervisory boards: evidence from the Berlin stock exchange and the parliament in interwar Germany

Cited by 4 publications

References 35 publications

Political connections and stock returns: evidence from the Boulangist campaign, 1888–1889

Political connections and stock returns: evidence from the Boulangist campaign, 1888–1889

The innovation paradox of TMT political capital in transition economy firms

The limits of control: corporate ownership and control of German joint-stock firms, 1869–1945

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