THE UTILITY OF CONTEMPLATION IN ARISTOTLE - (M.D.) Walker Aristotle on the Uses of Contemplation. Pp. x + 261. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Cased, £75, US$99.99. ISBN: 978-1-108-42110-2.

Abstract

propositions attaches to the copula (so the proposition is interpreted de dicto), and even when it seems to be part of the predicate (de re), it does not apply to the res predicated, but only to the predicative function of the predicate. Here D. should have paused to explain how the controversial syllogistic mood Barbara NXN, held by Aristotle to be valid, can be explained on the assumption that, however expressed, the modality always attaches to the copula. Many original interpretations set forth in the book deserve discussion. A few of them are startling and unpalatable despite an able defence (e.g. the idea that even the primary substance of the Categories is a 'function of predication', pp. 60-1, contrast Cat. 5, 3a36), but in reviewing such a magnificent book it is only fair to end on a highlight. This is the interpretation of Aristotle's discussion of future contingents and logical determinism in the much debated Chapter 9 of De interpretatione. D. argues that Aristotle is not attacking the Principle of Bivalence ('every sentence is true or false'), but only a strong interpretation of this principle according to which, in a contradictory pair, one sentence is true and the other false. On this interpretation, the principle harmlessly holds for declarative sentences about the past and the present, but implies determinism when extended to sentences about the future. From the point of view of standard modern logic, this is the only viable interpretation of the Principle of Bivalence; so the only way to avoid determinism would be to restrict this principle and accept that sentences about future contingents are simply neither true nor false. Several interpreters think that this is also Aristotle's conclusion. By contrast, D. argues that Aristotle's strategy is not to show that the scope of Bivalence must be narrowed, but rather to define this principle as the claim that every sentence is true-or-false, where the hyphens indicate that the alternative must be read sensu composito. In the case of sentences about a contingent future, this weaker formulation only requires that they are bound to get their truth value when the time comes, regardless of the fact that now they are still neither true nor false. In this way Aristotle can concede that at the time of the utterance sentences about the future lack truth value, and claim at the same time that Bivalence holds for all declarative sentences, whatever their tense. I think this suggestion deserves serious attention. There is a chance that some progress has been made on one of the most discussed texts in Aristotle.