The Use of History in Putin’s Russia

Monumental minnepolitikk: Russlands bruk av sovjetiske og russiske krigsminnesmerker i Nord-Norge 2014–2023

“…Bakgrunnen for intensiveringen av minnepolitikken, både i utlandet og i hjemlandet, er at Russland tolker kritikk mot det offisielle narrativet som trusler mot den russiske statens integritet (Kangaspuro, 2021, s. 22) Kritikken kommer fra postsovjetiske land der den Den røde armés framrykning i Europa framstilles som starten på en ny og mye lengre okkupasjon under den kalde krigen, og ikke som en frigjøring fra nazistisk okkupasjon. Spesielt i Baltikum, Ukraina, Polen og Tsjekkia har fjerning eller omdefinering av kommunistiske symboler og monumenter blitt brukt av Kreml som beviser for at minnene om Sovjetunionens krigsinnsats er utsatt for ondsinnet «falsifisering» av russisk-fiendtlige krefter i Vesten (Antonov, 2019, s. 410-421;Ehala, 2009;Gabowitsch, 2018;McGlynn, 2023). Russlands regimestyrte minnepolitikk kommer derfor lettest til syne i møte med andre staters motstridende perspektiver på fortiden.…”

Mnemonic Soft Power: The Role of Memory in China's Quest for Global Power

“…In this understanding, memories can be thought of as a malleable and exploitable resource of political power, and memory consequently constitutes as much an arena of global competition as other domains of global politics, such as the military or economic realm. Russia's recent attempt to rhetorically and politically draw on its own understanding of the past in order to legitimise its unlawful invasion of Ukraine – both internationally and internally – provides a recent and poignant case in point (Mälksoo, 2023: 1; McGlynn, 2023).…”

The 2014 Russian Invasion of Crimea: Identity and Geopolitics

“…Putin's revisionist strategy is not recent and has been largely justified by his great power policy. Especially since the return to the presidency in 2012, he has been engendering an identity reformulation project that relies heavily on an affective appeal to memories of grandiose events that marked Russia's history (Danilova 2015;Kangaspuro 2022;Lassila 2022;McGlynn 2023), though memory politics were made a matter of state interest from 2005 onwards (Wijermars 2019). The formula seems simple and boils down to promoting a particular historiography that highlights: a.…”

“…Following the contributions of Katalin Miklóssy (2022), Mariëlle Wijermars (2022) and Markku Kangaspuro (2022), Russian exceptionalism, in this sense, can be understood as the idea that Russia holds unique civilizational and ideological characteristics that have made the state predestined to greatness. Consequently, it is because of this exceptionalism that Russia holds the messianic mission to share its superior political and ideological structure with others, especially those in need for salvation (McGlynn 2023). b.…”

“…As a historic narrative is systematically reproduced, it becomes hegemonic, making it more likely for the protagonists to legitimize their own interests among society (Çapan 2017). Such a historiographical production process reflects the celebration of specific memories and affections, that is, the reproduction of history through a particular perspective, highlighting the events and the peoples considered most relevant by those who concentrate the power of discursive formation (McGlynn 2023;Rahman 2015). History, thus, when made the subject of politics, is defined by the overlap of deliberate projects of remembering and forgetting (Ringmar 1996).…”