The US market for SO2 permits

Conrad, Klaus; Kohn, Robert E.

doi:10.1016/s0301-4215(96)00010-9

Cited by 26 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Each allowance entitles the owner to emit 1 ton/year of SO 2 , and these allowances can be bought and sold on the open market. [56][57][58][59] Allowances cannot be used to evade other emission requirements for attaining NAAQS, emission standards, or PSD increments. The initial allocation scheme was complex, and there are bonuses and exemptions for certain situations.…”

Section: Us Law: the Clean Air Act Of 1970mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A maximum emission cap is established for a pollutant, set of sources, and geographical region. 57,[64][65][66][67][68] Emission allowances are distributed by formula or auction, and each source must possess sufficient annual allowances to account for its emissions. Allowances may be allocated to different sources owned by the same facility or sold to other facilities.…”

Section: Us Law: the Clean Air Act Of 1970mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Visibility: Science and Regulation

Watson

2002

Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association

933

548

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The 1999 Regional Haze Rule provides a context for this review of visibility, the science that describes it, and the use of that science in regulatory guidance. The scientific basis for the 1999 regulation is adequate. The deciview metric that tracks progress is an imperfect but objective measure of what people see near the prevailing visual range. The definition of natural visibility conditions is adequate for current planning, but it will need to be refined as visibility improves. Emissions from other countries will set achievable levels above those produced by natural sources. Some natural events, notably dust storms and wildfires, are episodic and cannot be represented by annual average background values or emission estimates. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission reductions correspond with lower sulfate (SO4(2-)) concentrations and visibility improvements in the regions where these have occurred. Non-road emissions have been growing more rapidly than emissions from other sources, which have remained stable or decreased since 1970. Simpler models representing transport, limiting precursor pollutants, and gas-to-particle equilibrium should be used to understand where and when emission reductions will be effective, rather than large complex models that have insufficient input and validation measurements. Examples of model-based source attribution show large differences among estimates from various modeling systems and with ambient measurements.

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Section: Us Law: the Clean Air Act Of 1970mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Us Law: the Clean Air Act Of 1970mentioning

confidence: 99%

Visibility: Science and Regulation

Watson

2002

Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association

933

548

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“…Also, annual allowance auctions are conducted by CBOT for the EPA at no charge. All these factors lead to lower transaction costs in the allowance market, which is noted in the literature (Conrad and Kohn 1996). High transaction costs are known to be impediments in a market; therefore, low transaction costs are desirable in the operation of any market (Nagurney and Dhanda 1999).…”

Section: Low Transaction Costsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…It also was brought about by the shift from a CCP approach to a market-oriented approach to pollution control. This has led to lowered abatement costs and to reduced potential cost savings, because the heterogeneity of costs across units also was reduced (Conrad and Kohn 1996). Therefore, low trading volume and low price of permits within the electric utility industry primarily reflect lowered cost of emission abatement and a choice of new abatement options.…”

Section: Prices Of Permitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The low prices and trading volumes are attributed most commonly to a variety of reasons: the presence of transactions costs (Doucet and Strauss 1994); uncertainty in the trading market (Bohi and Burtraw 1992;Burtraw 1996); an excess of new allowances greater than the original initial distribution (Rico 1995); local regulations that lead buyers to become sellers (Coggins and Swinton 1996); and competition in the coal, natural gas, and scrubber industries (Burtraw 1996;Ellerman and Montero 1996). However, Conrad and Kohn (1996) present a model of emissions trading and conclude that the decline in allowance prices was brought about by the proliferation of new allowances and tight air standards in some areas, coupled with irreversible investments in abatement equipment.…”

Section: Prices Ofpermitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Market-Based Solution to Acid Rain: The Case of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) Trading Program

Dhanda

1999

Journal of Public Policy & Marketing

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Policy options designed to reduce such environmental degradation are based on the belief that pollution is a residual (i/.9commodity that is created concurrently with a valued commodity. As Randall (1987, pg. 359) notes, "When residual discommodities are produced jointly with some other activity and released into the collective goods environment KANWALROOP KATHY DHANDA is an assistant professor. Dr. Robert B. Pamplin Jr. School of Business Administration, The University of Portland. The author thanks Dean Ron Hill and reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

İriş

2017

Environmental Economics and Sustainability

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In the standard emission problem, each country's ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country. However, such policy decisions are often influenced by political parties' incentives to be elected. Voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones. As a result, political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level, at a cost of higher emission level, in order to satisfy voters' expectations in economic issues. Therefore, this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels. In doing so, we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets, as well as asymmetric technology levels. We find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain. Furthermore, technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact. These results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects.

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The US market for SO2 permits

Cited by 26 publications

References 17 publications

Visibility: Science and Regulation

Visibility: Science and Regulation

A Market-Based Solution to Acid Rain: The Case of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) Trading Program

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

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The US market for SO2 permits

Cited by 26 publications

References 17 publications

Visibility: Science and Regulation

Visibility: Science and Regulation

A Market-Based Solution to Acid Rain: The Case of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Trading Program

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

A Market-Based Solution to Acid Rain: The Case of the Sulfur Dioxide (SO₂) Trading Program