The unresolved question on COVID‐19 virus origin: The three cards game?

Borsetti, Alessândra; Scarpa, Fabio; Maruotti, Antonello; Divino, Fabio; Ceccarelli, Giancarlo; Giovanetti, Marta; Ciccozzi, Massimo

doi:10.1002/jmv.27519

Cited by 24 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Of course, this does not imply that BA.2.75 cannot become more dangerous or generate new subvariants following new mutations going forward. 8 , 9 However, based on current data, it does not appear to present an alarming situation and phylogenomic reconstruction shows that BA.5 and BA.4 Omicron descendent lineages continued to be dominant globally. Of course, the monitoring on BA.2.75 must continue uninterrupted (as well as the monitoring of all other lineages) to identify and/or predict the occurrence of an expansion in population size flaked by an increase of genetic variability, if any.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 94%

On the SARS‐CoV‐2 BA.2.75 variant: A genetic and structural point of view

Scarpa¹,

Sanna²,

Azzena³

et al. 2022

Journal of Medical Virology

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Comparison of the electrostatic potential surface of the Centaurus and BA.2 Spike receptor binding domains (RBDs). Red and blue colors indicate negative and positive potential, respectively. The color scale ranges from −5.0 to +5.0 kT/e. The RBD is oriented with the ACE2 interface in the front. Position of the R493 in BA.2 is marked by the white arrow. Calculations have been carried out with the software PROPKA3 12 while in-silico mutagenesis by means of PyMOL Molecular Graphics System v.2 (available at https://pymol.org/2/). The conformation of the side chains of the mutagenized structures was optimized by the application of the software FoldX 5.0. 13

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Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 94%

On the SARS‐CoV‐2 BA.2.75 variant: A genetic and structural point of view

Scarpa¹,

Sanna²,

Azzena³

et al. 2022

Journal of Medical Virology

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“…Actualmente en el 2022, este es un tema de alta preocupación y muy controversial, los debates han sido, y siguen siendo muy discutidos, a menudo violentos y agresivos e inmersos en el ámbito de la política, los conflictos geoestratégicos y los intereses personales que se van apoderando del análisis científico (Dawood et al, 2022). Entre las dos hipótesis principales del origen del virus se tienen un origen natural a través del modelo de "desbordamiento" ("spillover") o un origen por fuga de laboratorio (Borsetti et al, 2021;Ruiz-Medina et al, 2021;Dawood et al, 2022;Frutos et al, 2022a). Muchas publicaciones recientemente han analizado la teoría del origen natural del virus SARS-CoV-2 y lo han confrontado con la teoría de la fuga de laboratorio.…”

Section: Figuraunclassified

“…Espejo-Sotelo & Tello-Arquiñego (2021), sostienen que los murciélagos pueden infectar de forma directa al hombre y que no es obligatoria la intervención de un hospedero intermediario como el pangolín. Para el 2020, los esfuerzos por identificar de forma específica al hospedero intermediario potencial del SARS-CoV-2 no han sido exitosos (Jo et al, 2020;Borsetti et al, 2021;Mohapatra & Menon, 2022). Sin embargo, la mayoría de la literatura científica al 2022 sigue señalando al pangolín como el posible reservorio y hospedero intermediario del SARS-CoV-2 (Altaf et al, 2022;Barroso et al, 2022;Haley, 2022;Holmes, 2022;Nguyen et al, 2022;Mohapatra & Menon, 2022).…”

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Una actualización con relación a la zoonosis del SARs-CoV-2 a dos años de la pandemia

Iannacone

Tejada

Alvariño

et al. 2022

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En la carta proporcionamos una actualización con relación al rol zoonótico del SARS-CoV-2 (Síndrome Respiratorio Agudo Severo 2) sobre todo al analizar la carta titulada: “Actualidad y controversias de la zoonosis como origen del SARS-CoV-2” (Espejo-Sotelo & Tello-Arquiñego, 2021), que analiza y actualiza el artículo de revisión “Enlaces zoonóticos del coronavirus SARS-CoV-2” (Iannacone et al., 2020). En la mencionada carta se mencionan aportes interesantes con relación a la temática. Sin embargo, a la fecha junio de 2022 se siguen sacando conclusiones controversiales con relación al tema.

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“… 4 , 5 These theories were later dismissed by studies, concluding that the virus most probably has natural origins, which is strengthened by the lack of signs of genetic engineering. 6 , 7 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Virus SARS-CoV-2 as a Potential Bioweapon in Light of International Literature

et al. 2022

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Introduction As of early 2022, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic still represents a worldwide medical emergency situation. The ongoing vaccination programs can slow down the spread of the virus; however, from time to time, the newly emerging variants of concern and antivaccination movements carry the possibility for the disease to remain in our daily lives. After the appearance of SARS-CoV-2, there was scholarly debate whether the virus was of natural origin, or it emerged from a laboratory, some even thinking the agent’s potential biological weapon properties suggest the latter scenario. Later, the bioweapon theory was dismissed by the majority of experts, but the question remains that despite its natural origin, how potent a biological weapon the SARS-CoV-2 virus can become over time. Materials and Methods Based on 12 bioweapon threat assessment criteria already published in 2018, we performed a literature search and review, focusing on relevant potential bioweapon properties of the virus SARS-CoV-2. Instead of utilizing a survey among experts, we tried to qualify and quantify characteristics according to the available data found in peer-reviewed papers. We also identified other key elements not mentioned in the original 12 bioweapon criteria, which can play an important role in assessing future biological weapons. Results According to the international literature we analyzed, SARS-CoV-2 is a moderately infectious agent (ID50 estimated between 100 and 1,000), with high infection-to-disease ratio (35%–45% rate of asymptomatic infected) and medium incubation period (1–34 days, mean 6–7 days). Its morbidity and mortality rate can be categorized as medium (high morbidity rate with significant mortality rate). It can be easily produced in large quantities, has high aerosol stability, and has moderate environmental stability. Based on laboratory experiments and statistical model analysis, it can form and is contagious with droplet nuclei, and with spray technique utilization, it could be weaponized effectively. Several prophylactic countermeasures are available in the form of vaccines; however, specific therapeutic options are much more limited. In connection with the original assessment criteria, the SARS-CoV-2 only achieved a “0” score on the ease of detection because of readily available, relatively sensitive, and specific rapid antigen tests. Based on the pandemic experience, we also propose three new assessment categories: one that establishes a mean to measure the necessary quarantine restrictions related to a biological agent, another one that can represent the personal protective equipment required to work safely with a particular agent, and a third one that quantifies the overall disruptive capability, based on previous real-life experiences. These factors could further specify the threat level related to potential biological weapons. Conclusions Our results show that the virus can become a potent bioweapon candidate in the future, achieving a total score of 24 out of 36 on the original 12 criteria. The SARS-CoV-2 has already proven its pandemic generating potential and, despite worldwide efforts, still remains an imminent threat. In order to be prepared for the future possibility of the virus arising as a bioweapon, we must remain cautious and take the necessary countermeasures.

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The unresolved question on COVID‐19 virus origin: The three cards game?

Cited by 24 publications

References 12 publications

On the SARS‐CoV‐2 BA.2.75 variant: A genetic and structural point of view

On the SARS‐CoV‐2 BA.2.75 variant: A genetic and structural point of view

Una actualización con relación a la zoonosis del SARs-CoV-2 a dos años de la pandemia

Analysis of the Virus SARS-CoV-2 as a Potential Bioweapon in Light of International Literature

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