The unity of haptic touch

Fulkerson, Matthew

doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.556610

Cited by 33 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Skeptics about intermodal feature binding awareness say that awareness of features' belonging to something common results from associations between sensory experiences or from ‘post‐perceptual processing (or inference).’ For instance, Fulkerson (, pp. 504–6) thinks distinct unimodal experiences are associated in a higher‐order multisensory experience, and Spence and Bayne (, § 7, p. 119) admit only extra‐perceptual apparent unity (cf., Bayne, ).…”

Section: Grade 3: Intermodal Binding Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grades of Multisensory Awareness

O’Callaghan

2017

Mind & Language

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Psychophysics and neuroscience demonstrate that different sensory systems interact and influence each other. Perceiving involves extensive cooperation and coordination among systems associated with sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Nonetheless, it remains unclear in what respects conscious perceptual awareness is multisensory. This article distinguishes six differing varieties of multisensory awareness, explicates their consequences, and thereby elucidates the multisensory nature of perception. It argues on these grounds that perceptual awareness need not be exhausted by that which is associated with each of the respective sensory modalities along with whatever accrues thanks to simple co‐consciousness.

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Section: Grade 3: Intermodal Binding Awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grades of Multisensory Awareness

O’Callaghan

2017

Mind & Language

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“…I am here focusing on those sensory modes that are relevant for perception, though my argument would have to be adapted only slightly to generalize to phenomenal states that are not perceptual states. For discussion of olfaction, see Batty (2010); for tactile experiences, see Fulkerson (2011); for taste, see Smith (2007); for auditory experiences, see Nudds (2001), O'Callaghan (2010), Phillips (2012), Wu and Cho (2013). See Macpherson (2011) for different ways of individuating the senses.…”

Section: Codamentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

Schellenberg

2017

Nous

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I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind‐independent properties, propositions, sense‐data, qualia, or intentional objects.

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“…Our intention is to appeal to a notion of sensory modality that is tied to unified perceptual experiences while recognizing that other ways of individuating the senses may be useful and give different results. This potential mismatch has seemed problematic in two types of cases: instances where there are cross‐modal illusions created by the influence of one modality on another (O'Callaghan, ) and instances where a unified experience seems to be the result of coordinated operations in multiple senses (Fulkerson, ). A good example of the latter is the experience of flavor when eating food (Fulkerson, ).…”

Section: Dip Reformulatedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded

Dove

Elpidorou

2016

Mind & Language

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Abstract:The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this essay, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition, focuses on features of physical concepts, and succeeds in explaining the appearance of contingency.

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The unity of haptic touch

Cited by 33 publications

References 26 publications

Grades of Multisensory Awareness

Grades of Multisensory Awareness

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded

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