The unity of caring and the rationality of emotion

Seidman, Jeffrey

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0637-z

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 32 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Pace Kant, it is hardly obvious, for instance, that in shooting an innocent Indian on the grounds that nineteen lives are worth more than one, Bernard Williams's Jim would betray a lack of respect for persons or a failure to recognize their from Kolodny (2003) and Kagan (1989). In Seidman (2016), I argue that valuable things of all kinds (not just persons) give everyone sufficient, non-insistent reasons to value them. dignity.…”

Section: He Borrows the Distinction Between Insistent And Non-insiste...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value

Seidman¹

2022

Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I elucidate a frame of mind that David Wiggins calls respect for nature, which he understands as a special attitude toward a sui generis object, Nature as such. A person with this frame of mind takes nature to impose defeasible limits on her action, so that there are some courses of action that she will refuse even to entertain, except in circumstances of dire exigency. I defend the reasonableness of respect for nature, drawing upon considerations in Wiggins's work. But I argue that the natural systems that comprise the proper object of respect for nature are not sui generis; they are kindred, for practical reason, to complex social, political, and economic systems that we inhabit. I argue that it is reasonable to treat all such valuable systems with a similar respect, and that this respect is continuous with the respect we owe to persons and to valuable objects more generally. In all of these cases, respect consists, in part, in a disposition to defeasible constraints on practical deliberation.

show abstract

Section: He Borrows the Distinction Between Insistent And Non-insiste...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He borrows the distinction between insistent and non-insistent reasons from Kolodny (2003) and Kagan (1989). In Seidman (2016), I argue that valuable things of all kinds (not just persons) give everyone sufficient, non-insistent reasons to value them.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value

Seidman¹

2022

Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…I thank an anonymous referee at the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy for bringing this to my attention. 76 Again, see the very illuminating discussion in Seidman (2016) about how emotional dispositions associated with caring can be masked and so fail to manifest. moral goods, not simply by having a calm temperament.…”

Section: Anger Is Not Required To Be Morally Virtuousmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In those cases, our anger is morally virtuous. 78 Nicolas Bommarito University of Buffalo Department of Philosophy npbommar@buffalo.edu 77 In his discussion of caring, Seidman (2016) argues that caring does not entail specific emotional dispositions, only dispositions to attend and to respond. Other emotional dispositions associated with caring are derivative of these and so can be blocked or altered.…”

Section: Anger Is Not Required To Be Morally Virtuousmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtuous and Vicious Anger

Bommarito

2017

JESP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two common views about anger and moral character. First, I respond to several arguments that attempt to show that all anger is vicious. Then I respond to the view that some anger is required to be a virtuous person. Anger, on my view, can be morally virtuous but is not a necessary condition for being a virtuous person. This best accommodates not only morally irrelevant failures to get angry but also allows for emotional variation among virtuous people.

show abstract

“… 7 For the idea that emotional vulnerability is constitutive of caring, see Jaworska (2007). For an account of valuing, building upon this idea, that explicitly recognizes aspects of valuing beyond mere emotional vulnerability, see Seidman (2009, 2016). As both Jaworska and I use the term, ‘emotional vulnerability’ should be read to include susceptibility to positive emotions as well as negative ones.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasons Not to Consider Our Options

Seidman¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I argue that a practical deliberator may have good reasons not to consider some option even though that option is what there is most reason, all things considered, for her to do. The most interesting reasons not to consider an option arise in cases where an agent cannot be compensated in kind for the loss of goods that she values. Where this is the case, an attitude of conservatism is warranted: it is reasonable to begin deliberation by considering only ‘no-regrets’ options, and to proceed to considering other possibilities only when the cost of continuing to consider only no-regrets options has become intolerably high. The account that I develop illuminates intuitions that help motivate deontological moral thought, and it can shed light on the complaint that there is something wrong with the way in which schematic thought experiments are frequently used in philosophy to drive moral theorizing.

show abstract

The unity of caring and the rationality of emotion

Cited by 6 publications

References 32 publications

Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value

Respect for Nature, Respect for Persons, Respect for Value

Virtuous and Vicious Anger

Reasons Not to Consider Our Options

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About