The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity

Abstract

This chapter sets out the unfinished semantic agenda of Kripke's Naming and Necessity, the first item of which is a positive theory of the meaning of proper names, and the propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing them. Although much of Kripke's discussion supports the Millian view that the meaning of a name is its referent and that the proposition expressed by a sentence containing the name is a singular Russellian proposition, these conclusions conflict with his contention that the propositions expressed by true identity sentences like Hesperus is Phosphorus or Cicero is Tully are knowable only a posteriori. It is shown that Kripke's argument for this contention is flawed, and that, because of this, the Millian conception of meaning remains a viable option – provided that the Millian can explain how speakers are able to use sentences that differ only in the substitution of one coreferential name for another to assert different things, to convey different information, and to express different beliefs. The second item on the unfinished semantic agenda of Naming and Necessity is showing how to extend the nondescriptive, Millian account of proper names to simple predicates involving natural kind terms. It is shown that many of Kripke's examples of true theoretical identity sentences contain such predicates, and that his explanation of the necessity of these sentences faces a serious challenge.

Donnellan, Nomes Millianos E O Contingente a Priori

“…Contudo, é evidente que falantes comuns não associam descrições de essências a nomes públicos como "Aristóteles". 4 Vale notar que Kripke evita deliberadamente se comprometer de maneira explícita com o millianismo (1980, p. 20), i.e., com a tese positiva de que o conteúdo semântico de nomes próprios é esgotado pelo referente, como notam Soames (2002, cap. 1) e Lycan (2008.…”

“…A razão disso é que ele não aceita algumas supostas consequências do millianismo. Uma delas é a tese de que nomes correferenciais são semanticamente equivalentes em qualquer contexto, inclusive em contextos epistêmicos, tal como defendem Soames (2002) e Salmon (1986. Além disso, ele parece acreditar que um milliano deve aceitar a existência de proposições singulares, tal como fez Russell e como fazem muitos dos referencialistas contemporâneos.…”

Baptizing Meanings for Concepts

“…The growing consensus in the philosophy of language is that linguistic terms get their meanings by a kind of dubbing that is a lot like a baptism ceremony (Kripke, 1972;Putnam, 1975;Burge, 1979;Soames, 2002). For example, consider the following expression.…”

The Semantic Content of Partially Descriptive Names

“…According to a slightly reformulated Millian view, defended recently by Soames (2002) and mentioned in agreement with him by Sullivan (2003), there are however interesting exceptional cases to this rule. Soames (2002) offers a detailed argument to show that certain Millian names have a twofold semantic structure.…”

“…Soames (2002) offers a detailed argument to show that certain Millian names have a twofold semantic structure. Although linguistically simple proper names typically do not contain any descriptive information, some complex names such as the phrases Princeton University or Professor Saul Kripke are regularly associated with descriptive properties that apply only contingently to their bearers.…”