The Uncertainties of a Preemptive Nuclear Attack

After the missiles: Sociopsychological effects of nuclear war.

“…To further complicate estimations, attacks might come in waves. Bunn and Tsipis (1983) suggested that first waves might be off their marks by some margin of error, and because of residual effects of first waves, second waves might be off even more or might be destroyed by lingering effects of first waves. Such inaccuracy could have the effect of scattering warheads, with many dropping in suburban and rural areas, generating interactions with unknown effects.…”

“…The side attacking first could not issue warnings to its citizens until detection by the target occurred a couple of minutes after launch, otherwise any hope of stopping the target’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be lost (Steinbruner, 1984). Because about 30 minutes would lapse between launch and detonation of ICBM warheads, if the attacker warned its citizens at the earliest opportunity and the target counterattacked immediately, the attacker’s citizens would have at most 28 minutes to escape the cities or seek shelter (missiles launched from submarines and aircraft would leave a shorter warning time; Bunn & Tsipis, 1983). Unless they were anticipating an attack under a “launch on warning” plan (Steinbruner, 1984), targeted officials might waste so much time funneling information of detection through channels that a warning would leave citizens almost no time to act.…”

“…Although some rural areas near missile silos would be destroyed (Bunn & Tsipis, 1983), many others would be initially unscathed. However, destruction of communication centers and the electromagnetic pulse generated by high altitude explosions would lead to a cutoff of electronic communications (Steinbrunner, 1984).…”