The Ubiquity and Strategic Complexity of Grand Coalition in the German Federal System

Kropp, Sabine

doi:10.1080/09644008.2010.515771

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…While this article starts from a more optimistic premise, it cannot directly refute this negative one. (Kropp 2010;Spier 2013). 5 Based on data in Abedi and Siaroff (2016 : Table 3).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Jacoby¹

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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Are 'grand coalitions' -coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system -good or bad for democracy? This article analyses that question in light of the recent rise of populist parties that large mainstream parties may try to exclude from government by forming grand coalitions with other large mainstream parties. I call this the 'sterilization' logic and note that mainstream parties' ability to do this varies widely. Where parties have previously used grand coalitions primarily according to a 'clientelistic' logic -for example, Austriamainstream parties may well be unable to rally the party system against insurgent populist challengers. Where mainstream parties have used grand coalitions exceptionally and for major institutional 'renovations' -for example, Germany -the grand coalition remains a viable option for responding to insurgent challenges, though this strategy is also quite risky. This article considers the implications for democracy by tracing recent developments in the context of the euro crisis and the European refugee situation. The major empirical referents are Austria and Germany -two countries with extensive experience and literature about grand coalitions -but the article draws out the implications of the analysis for other European parliamentary contexts.

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“…While this article starts from a more optimistic premise, it cannot directly refute this negative one. (Kropp 2010;Spier 2013). 5 Based on data in Abedi and Siaroff (2016 : Table 3).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a longer list, see Müller (2008: 509-20). 7 German specialists refer to 'segmentation,' a similar concept (Kropp 2010).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Jacoby¹

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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“…In fact, Merkel’s rhetoric style saps all dynamic and controversy from the campaign, thereby lulling her opponents’ potential voters into a stupor and readying them to acquiesce to a continuation of her chancellorship (Blätte, 2009; Von Lucke, 2010). She achieves this strategic advantage by claiming the ideological middle ground and marginalising the right wing of her own party on the assumption that disgruntled conservative voters for a lack of alternatives would ultimately stay loyal to the CDU (Kessler and Michels, 2009; Kropp, 2010; Neurer, 2014). For this asymmetrical demobilisation of voters to be a success, her political views have to be notoriously vague – as her critics gripe – or balanced and carefully adapted to popular sentiment and public discourse – as pollsters and campaign strategists acknowledge (Janker, 2017; Streeck, 2016; Ude, 2017).…”

Section: Assessing Merkel’s Chancellorship I: a Winning Electoral mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The debate is fuelled by a range of academic studies that zoom in on particular aspects of her tenure. Her CDU leadership and repositioning of the party has been explored by Wiliarty (2008Wiliarty ( , 2013, Clemens (2007Clemens ( , 2009Clemens ( , 2010, Green (2013), Maier (2013), and Turner et al (2013); foreign policy performance by Mushaben (2009), Gueort (2013), Janes (2014), Wood (2016), and Wendler (2017); her domestic record by Mushaben (2016); the constitutional role of the chancellor and challenges of coalition government by Kropp (2010), Jalalzai (2011), Olsen (2011), and Clemens (2011); the refugee crisis by Mushaben (2017) and Dostal (2017); and her responses to the Eurozone crisis is addressed in a paper by Hertner and Miskimmon (2015). From this brief review, it will appear that the groundwork has been done and it is time to make sense of the current kaleidoscope of perspectives and weave a more coherent narrative of Angela Merkel's performance in office.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the strategy of government: A statecraft assessment of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship from 2005 to 2017

Schnee

2019

Politics

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As chancellor Angela Merkel is on course to tie with Helmut Kohl as the longest serving democratically elected German head of government, it is time to attempt an initial assessment of the first 12 years of her chancellorship from 2005 to 2017 which left its marks both on German politics and European affairs. Bulpitt’s statecraft model is applied to evaluate the chancellor’s performance and to judge both achievements and shortcomings of Merkel’s incumbency. The theoretical approach chosen provides a scaffolding to direct the research which casts particular attention on four descriptive categories that help condition judgements of a leader’s success and failure and take into consideration attitude and behaviour of elites within the system whose actions and degree of allegiance may have advanced or constrained Merkel’s leadership. The findings suggest a mixed record that portrays Merkel as an efficient operator whose clout hinged on a firm grip on the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) apparatus and effective management of the parliamentary party. Yet even at the apex of her power, Merkel did not achieve or seek argument hegemony in the public discourse.

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“…Research has observed a growing diversification of the regional party systems which has generated multi-coloured Länder coalition governments. As a consequence, majorities often need to be negotiated in the Bundesrat, which makes joint decision-making less calculable for the federal government, but enhances flexibility by dissolving the logic of the formerly bipolar party competition (Kropp, 2010).…”

Section: Actors Of Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arraying institutional layers in federalism reforms: lessons from the German case

Behnke

Kropp²

2016

Regional & Federal Studies

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The introductory article to this Special Issue offers an analytical framework for investigating federal reforms. By looking through the lens of institutional theory, it provides an avenue for grasping the basic mechanisms which are at work in reform processes. It is argued that the German case which comprises three distinct reform steps stretching out over more than one decade represents an especially suitable example for understanding the general logics of federal reform. As a "prototype• of sequential, asynchronous reforms, it allows for generating theoretical insights beyond the findings of a single case study. The article reveals that layering, sequencing, and the linkage of different arenas are the most relevant aspects to be considered when examining federal reforms. Finally, it is established how the contributions to this Special Issue refer to the analytical categories worked out in this introduction.

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The Ubiquity and Strategic Complexity of Grand Coalition in the German Federal System

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Grand Coalitions and Democratic Dysfunction: Two Warnings from Central Europe

Exploring the strategy of government: A statecraft assessment of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship from 2005 to 2017

Arraying institutional layers in federalism reforms: lessons from the German case

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