“…I anticipate the following pointed question from Shabo (: 18; cf. Rosen : 79–80): “Given that Sam firmly believed that slaveholding is permissible and did not believe that slaveholding is wrong, in virtue of what could it have been reasonable to demand that Sam decide against holding slaves?” Answer (cf.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 97%
“… e. Reflection on (8*) can also help us see our way past the following thesis that Seth Shabo (: 11) employs in arguing for the impossibility of a directly blameworthy proximally undetermined action (where an event E is “proximally undetermined” just in case the immediate past and laws of nature are logically consistent with E's nonoccurrence):(GP) We cannot reasonably hold a self‐governing agent to our normative expectations concerning how she chooses and acts on some occasion unless we can reasonably expect her to guide her choice and action by those expectations on that occasion.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Shabo (: 11), a “self‐governing agent” is “someone who faces a choice between two alternative courses of action, where she will be free from external interference in adopting either course, and where she will exercise her ordinary capacity for self‐governance … in selecting whichever course she does.” Moreover, one “guides one's decision to A by the expectation that one decide to A” only if one's belief that one morally should A is among the causes of one's decision to A (cf. Shabo : 9–10).…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Shabo (: 11), a “self‐governing agent” is “someone who faces a choice between two alternative courses of action, where she will be free from external interference in adopting either course, and where she will exercise her ordinary capacity for self‐governance … in selecting whichever course she does.” Moreover, one “guides one's decision to A by the expectation that one decide to A” only if one's belief that one morally should A is among the causes of one's decision to A (cf. Shabo : 9–10). Given other claims that Shabo (: 7–9) endorses and which I hereby concede, (GP) entails the following claim:(GP*) A self‐governing agent S is directly blameworthy for deciding to A only if, when S decided to A, it was reasonable to expect S to decide against A‐ing on the basis of a belief that S morally should not A.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Shabo : 9–10). Given other claims that Shabo (: 7–9) endorses and which I hereby concede, (GP) entails the following claim:(GP*) A self‐governing agent S is directly blameworthy for deciding to A only if, when S decided to A, it was reasonable to expect S to decide against A‐ing on the basis of a belief that S morally should not A.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
“…I anticipate the following pointed question from Shabo (: 18; cf. Rosen : 79–80): “Given that Sam firmly believed that slaveholding is permissible and did not believe that slaveholding is wrong, in virtue of what could it have been reasonable to demand that Sam decide against holding slaves?” Answer (cf.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 97%
“… e. Reflection on (8*) can also help us see our way past the following thesis that Seth Shabo (: 11) employs in arguing for the impossibility of a directly blameworthy proximally undetermined action (where an event E is “proximally undetermined” just in case the immediate past and laws of nature are logically consistent with E's nonoccurrence):(GP) We cannot reasonably hold a self‐governing agent to our normative expectations concerning how she chooses and acts on some occasion unless we can reasonably expect her to guide her choice and action by those expectations on that occasion.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Shabo (: 11), a “self‐governing agent” is “someone who faces a choice between two alternative courses of action, where she will be free from external interference in adopting either course, and where she will exercise her ordinary capacity for self‐governance … in selecting whichever course she does.” Moreover, one “guides one's decision to A by the expectation that one decide to A” only if one's belief that one morally should A is among the causes of one's decision to A (cf. Shabo : 9–10).…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Shabo (: 11), a “self‐governing agent” is “someone who faces a choice between two alternative courses of action, where she will be free from external interference in adopting either course, and where she will exercise her ordinary capacity for self‐governance … in selecting whichever course she does.” Moreover, one “guides one's decision to A by the expectation that one decide to A” only if one's belief that one morally should A is among the causes of one's decision to A (cf. Shabo : 9–10). Given other claims that Shabo (: 7–9) endorses and which I hereby concede, (GP) entails the following claim:(GP*) A self‐governing agent S is directly blameworthy for deciding to A only if, when S decided to A, it was reasonable to expect S to decide against A‐ing on the basis of a belief that S morally should not A.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Shabo : 9–10). Given other claims that Shabo (: 7–9) endorses and which I hereby concede, (GP) entails the following claim:(GP*) A self‐governing agent S is directly blameworthy for deciding to A only if, when S decided to A, it was reasonable to expect S to decide against A‐ing on the basis of a belief that S morally should not A.…”
Section: Some Additional Lessons About Cognitive Requirements For Blamentioning
Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.
Scientific discoveries are often to some degree influenced by luck. Whether luck's influence is at odds with common-sense intuitions about responsibility, is the central concern of the philosophical debate about moral luck. Do scientists acknowledge that luck plays a role in their work andif sodo they consider it morally problematic? The present article discusses the results of four focus groups with scientists, who were asked about their views on luck in their fields and its moral implications. The participants underscored circumstantial luck as a key dimension of luck in science. Nevertheless, most participants insisted that there are ways of executing 'control' in science: They believe that virtues and skills can increase one's chances for success. The cultivation of these skills and virtues was considered a reasonable ground for pride. Prizes and rewards were rarely tied to personal desert, but instead to their societal function.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
