The Two Sources of Moral Standing

Abstract

There are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing-one emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments providing evidence for our account of lay judgments about moral standing, and argue that these results lend plausibility to the proposed causal link between folk moral cognition and the philosophical traditions.Is it morally wrong to cause pain to or, more generally, to harm orangutans, rats, cardinals, halibuts, shrimp, or ants? Where should we draw the line and why? Is it morally wrong to keep chimpanzees in captivity, to sequester killer whales in marine theme parks, or to put guppies in aquariums? Where should we draw the line and why? Is it morally wrong to use cows' milk?And why isn't it wrong to cut down trees and collect fruit (supposing it isn't)? More generally, how do we decide which beings should be taken into account when we assess the moral significance of actions? That is, how do we decide which beings have moral standing?By and large, philosophers are of two minds about moral standing: Some emphasize the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, and are willing to grant moral standing to all sentient creatures; others emphasize sophisticated forms of cognition such as rationality and complex lifestyles, restricting moral standing to a few species-sometimes to humans only. This division in philosophical theorizing about moral standing is deeply entrenched, and it has a long history.Our goal in this article is to explain why there are these two traditions of thought about moral standing: Why is it that some philosophers have emphasized the capacity to feel pain and pleasure, and others the complexity of cognition and lifestyle?

Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts

“…In the literature on mind perception, agency is often defined in terms of "higher" cognitive capacities, such as being able to reason, communicate, exert self-control, imagine, and plan one's actions (see especially Gray et al, 2007; but also Gray & Schein, 2012;Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012;Gray & Wegner, 2012;Haslam et al, 2008;Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Consistent with the mind perception literature, Sytsma and Machery (2012) operationalized agency in terms of higher intelligence, which includes such traits as language, creativity, and the capacity for sophisticated culture (e.g., music, poetry). Another perspective from social psychology defines agency more broadly in terms of being active, tenacious, effective at pursing one's goals, and having control over one's environment (Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, & Wojciszke, 2008;Abele & Wojciszke, 2007).…”

The Robots of the Dawn of Experimental Philosophy of Mind

“…Destiny's Child and the Catholic Church (Huebner, Bruno, and Sarkissian, 2010), to monkeys and metallic slugs (Sytsma and Machery, 2012a), to ghosts and spirits (Buckwalter and Phelan, forthcoming-a), to sophisticated cyborgs and robots (Huebner, 2010), and many more examples besides.…”

An Insufferable Business: Ethics, Nonhuman Animals and Biomedical Experiments

“…A being has moral standing if she or he can be morally wronged [69]. Possession of moral standing means that the being concerned should be given moral consideration.…”

“…Possession of moral standing means that the being concerned should be given moral consideration. There is considerable discussion about the source of moral standing [69] and the foundations are complex and nuanced. It is not possible to do justice to the discussion here.…”