The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980

Abstract

This article analyzes the Turkish military's decision to take over the government on 12 September 1980. It argues that just because the military believed itself to be a true guardian state, it easily considered intervention a legitimate solution. The perceived threats to the integrity of the Republican state posed by rampant terrorism were the key elements driving soldiers towards intervention. In retrospect, the military's willingness to learn from experience and the role played by civilians in encouraging the military to take over the reins of government are striking features of the whole episode.

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