The Turkey-Africa Bromance: Key Drivers, Agency, and Prospects

Abstract

Turkish-African relations have consistently exhibited strong growth since Ankara declared 2005 as ‘the year of Africa.’ Turkey’s growing economic, political, and security involvement in Africa reflects Ankara’s need to establish new markets for its manufactured goods and its defense and armaments industry and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor different from traditional Western players on the continent. African countries have been astute in their engagement with Ankara in terms of exercising leverage in the evolving Turkish-African partnership. They seek to attract Turkish foreign direct investment, diversify economic and political partners to reduce dependency and fuel their state-building projects. Ankara’s domestic economic woes notwithstanding, Turkey’s growing footprint in Africa will likely continue to produce positive results for both sides.

Does Turkey Support Development in West Africa? The Example of Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast

“…Moreover, the Turkish power elite, whether secularists or conservatives, share the conviction that the world is moving towards a post-Western order (Josseran, 2022). This meets the needs of African autocrats who seek to attract Turkish foreign direct investment, diversify economic and political partners to reduce dependency and fuel their state-building projects (Dahir, 2021).…”

“…Accordingly, Turkish transport infrastructure, hospitals, and schools proliferated all over the country in addition to personnel training of Somali security forces by the Turkish military. The Turkish projects in Somalia are praised for their tangibility, respect for ownership, and deploying staff to the field, despite the threats to security mainly from ISIS affiliate al-Shabaab terrorist group (Dahir, 2021). This arose the interest of other SSA countries, including Sudan, that was also interested in security, peace-building, and mediation initiatives.…”

“…Thus, Khartoum accepted a mediation offer by Ankara to end its border dispute with Ethiopia. Angola and other SSA governments requested the cheap and effective Turkish Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drones after it was credited with swinging the fate of conflicts, e. g. in Libya and the Tigray war (Dahir, 2021). The latter was used in a controversial attack by the Ethiopian National Defense Force during the Tigray War in November 2022 (Bearak & Kelly & Sohyun Lee, 2022).…”

“…Graph 1: Turkey's influence in Africa on the rise since the late 1990s Source: Cagaptay & Cook &Soukkarieh, 2022 The apathy of successive Turkish governments only changed with the adoption of the 'Africa Action Plan' in 1998, when Ankara tried to increase its diplomatic, political, economic and cultural interactions with SSA (İpek, 2017;Hammoura, 2016). Another indicator of its improving foreign relations was the Turkish declaration of 2005 as 'the year of Africa' (Dahir, 2021). Thereby, Ankara as a new emerging power on the continent (Alrmizan, 2023) tried to establish new markets for its manufactured goods, notably for its defence and armaments industry, and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor.…”

“…Thereby, Ankara as a new emerging power on the continent (Alrmizan, 2023) tried to establish new markets for its manufactured goods, notably for its defence and armaments industry, and present itself as a relevant regional and global actor. Thereby it was different from traditional Western players in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), because it was free of the latter's colonial baggage, promising a win-win constellation for both sides (Dahir, 2021;Besenyő & Oláh, 2012). Moreover, by adapting to a multi-centric world, Ankara moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings with SSA by expanding its cooperation with non-state actors (İpek &Biltekin, 2013).…”