The Trust Legislation of 1914

Durand, E. Dana

doi:10.2307/1885298

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…In order to describe an evolutionary pattern in board interlocks research, we identified four different periods each of them characterized by major changes in the field of study and marked by breakthrough and innovative articles in terms of theoretical approaches or methods. Our first observation window covers the period from the first publication on interlocking directorates in 1914 (Durand, 1914; Dixon, 1914) until Koenig, Gogel and Sonquist’s literature review of 1979 that resumed the theoretical explanations of interlocks’ causes. In this period, the interest on interlocks seems to be infrequent and concentrated mainly around the 1970s.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Main articles evidenced the legal and economic features of interlocking directorates. While Durand (1914) evidenced the collusive nature of interlocks explaining the reason of their legal restrictions, Dixon (1914) evidenced four economic causes of interlocks. According to the latter interlocking directorates arise for financial or industrial purposes, to develop business or to restrain competition (Dixon, 1914).…”

Section: The Emerging Debate (1914–1970)mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Directorate ties: a bibliometric analysis

Caiazza

Simoni

2019

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Purpose Over the last 100 years, research on interlocking directorates has proliferated. The purpose of this paper is to realize a bibliometric analysis of articles on interlocking directorates to identify the evolutionary patterns that characterize the studies on board interlocks. Design/methodology/approach A bibliometric analysis of articles on interlocking directorates published since 1914 was realized to evidence how research has evolved over time. Papers were classified according to the research topic, the type of article and the use of different theories to explain board interlocks’ causes and effects. Findings The authors identified four different periods that characterize board interlocks studies: the emerging debate, the earliest modern era, the modern era and the post-modern era. Originality/value This bibliometric analysis assesses the extant literature by highlighting emerging trends and identifying several avenues for future research.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Emerging Debate (1914–1970)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Directorate ties: a bibliometric analysis

Caiazza

Simoni

2019

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“…Since the act was adopted, much research has analyzed the antecedents of interlocks at the organization level, descriptively discussing the legal and economic issues without reference to a theoretical framework. For example, Durand () describes how interlocks are motivated by the fact that inter‐corporate connections can facilitate collusion among rivals. Similarly, Dixon () explains that interlocks are motivated by the need to facilitate business relations between firms or to restrain competition between firms.…”

Section: What We Think We Know About Interlocking Directoratesmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Institutional Contingency Perspective of Interlocking Directorates

Caiazza

Cannella

Phan³

et al. 2018

Int J Management Reviews

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Interlocking directorates, in which companies are linked by the directors that serve on their boards, exist globally. It is an expression of hegemonic power exercised by the elites of a society, and has been studied with great interest by organizational sociologists, management scholars and financial economists. The interest emanates from the effect that interlocks have on wealth creation and distribution, and from the perspective that interlocks can tell us how elites in a society are networked. Although diverse theoretical perspectives have informed the research on interlocking directorates, this review shows that the Anglo-American perspective dominates. This dominance is notable not only in the volume of Anglo-American studies, but also in theories employed by international studies. For example, most international studies use agency theory to investigate the welfare implications of interlocks, but many countries do not use the Anglo-American legal regime, which is the basis for agency theory. This paper expands the theoretical basis of the review to include class hegemony and resource dependence, to articulate better the causes and consequences of interlocks in the international context. The paper also extends theory by showing that institutions have an important influence on interlocks, so that the latter can be welfare-depleting in one institutional setting, while welfare-enhancing in another. The review concludes by discussing the implication for future research.

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“…While the Federal Trade Commission, like the Bureau of Corporations, continued to focus on publicity, the main difference between the two was in the authority and enforcement powers to successfully mediate corporations with the public, political, and juridical actors. Durand (, 91–2) describes how the commission constituted a significant improvement over the bureau since it had the expertise of the bureau, but also was authorized “to require annual or special reports from any corporation engaged in interstate or foreign commerce except banks and common carriers” and to impose “penalties for failure to make reports required by the commission or for making false reports.” Durand (, 91) contended: “useful as have been the investigations of the bureau, the public has a right to expect from this new commission results of a far more important character.” Consistent with the thinking of Woodrow Wilson, the commission was viewed as providing a more continuous form of administrative action and corporate surveillance. This emphasis on administration meant that accounting expertise became increasingly important.…”

Section: Institutionalizing Publicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impotence of Accountability: The Relationship Between Greater Transparency and Corporate Reform

Radcliffe

Spence

Stein

2016

Contemporary Accting Res

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This paper explores the role of accounting in the attempted reform of the corporation during the "progressive era" in the United States. Focusing on the activities of three institutional bodies in the early twentieth century, the paper documents how their repeated recourse to "publicity," which relied crucially on accounting technologies, failed to turn the corporation into an entity more sensitive to the public interest. Specifically, two interrelated contributions are made to existing literature on accounting and corporate governance. Firstly, the paper documents the early historical development of the now taken-for-granted phenomenon of accounting and adjudicating at the entity level (Miller and Power 2013). Secondly, the paper offers a rejoinder to present-day projects of corporate governance which identify better and enhanced accountability as key to the successful reform of the corporation. During the progressive era, accounting expanded and territorialized new spaces, bringing trusts out of a hitherto secretive, private realm and into the view of the public. Yet this was not enough to engender substantive corporate reform.

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The Trust Legislation of 1914

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Directorate ties: a bibliometric analysis

Directorate ties: a bibliometric analysis

An Institutional Contingency Perspective of Interlocking Directorates

The Impotence of Accountability: The Relationship Between Greater Transparency and Corporate Reform

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