The Tripartite Regulation Game of Carbon Financial Products Based on the Prospect Theory

Xu, Yun; Dong, Guanglong; Liu, Changyu

doi:10.3389/fenvs.2020.610732

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(31 reference statements)

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“…, 2021). However, there is a need for devising tough government regulations to protect investor's right, to introduce buyer-driven activities and enhance firm's performance in green innovation, to reduce uncertainty by sustainability indices, to cut green production costs and maintain cooperation among government, consumers, firms and FIs to drive green financial system (Yu et al. , 2020; Awan et al.…”

Section: Discussion and Outcome Of The Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Green and socially responsible finance: past, present and future

Dervi

Khan

Saba

et al. 2022

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PurposeGreen finance has shown the importance of being socially responsible and supporting the flow of financial instruments to develop environmentally sustainable and ethical business models. The growing trends raised the need for a quantitative study to address scientific performance analysis and intellectual development. This paper aims to cater quantitative statistics, through a bibliometric review to understand the vital intellectual and influential constitution of green and socially responsible finance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors apply trending and cutting-edge quali-quantitative approach of bibliometric citation analysis and review of 280 journal articles from the Web of Science database for the period of 1981–2021.FindingsThe results identify the leading academic authors, journals, institutions and countries with relation to green and socially responsible finance literature. We also discuss three research streams in this field: (1) overview of green finance, perception and investor behavior; (2) analysis of performance models and growth factors of green finance; (3) pricing mechanism of SRI. Finally, we identify the research gaps within existing green finance literature, proposing 30 research questions for the future agenda.Research limitations/implicationsThe study confines on the Web of Science database, English published articles in known journals and reviews only. It relies on a reputable source and top scientific productions with the most direct link to green finance.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors knowledge, this paper is the first to discuss research streams in the literature of Green finance from a bibliometric aspect along with vast coverage of articles from reputed journals and databases till date. The results of this research along with future research questions will guide the researchers and academicians to further explore and stand on solid quantitative basis regarding the scientific development of Green finance.

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Section: Discussion and Outcome Of The Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Green and socially responsible finance: past, present and future

Dervi

Khan

Saba

et al. 2022

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show abstract

“…Xie et al ( 2020 ) introduced carbon quota and carbon emissions trading policies into the dual-channel supply chain model and believed that the government designed incentive measures to regulate the carbon market. Yu et al ( 2020 ) analyzed the game relationship between the government, enterprises, and investors from the perspective of regulation, and believed that governments should engage in low-carbon markets and regulate them through policies. Zhu et al ( 2018 ) and He et al ( 2016 ), based on the efforts of supply chain enterprises to reduce carbon emissions, should guide enterprises to reduce emissions and give priority to subsidies rather than taxes.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategy Considering Government Subsidy and Free Riding Behavior

Gui

Xue

et al. 2022

Environmental Engineering Science

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Government subsidy can greatly encourage supply chain enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. To quickly occupy the market, supply chain enterprises form alliances. However, enterprises in the alliance have speculative psychology, and the impact of such free riding behavior on the carbon emissions reduction willingness of supply chain enterprises is still unclear. In this article, government subsidies and free riding behavior parameters are introduced to build a carbon emissions reduction decision model for the government, manufacturers, and suppliers, and the impact of government subsidies and free riding behavior on the decision making of supply chain enterprises is analyzed through evolutionary game theory. The analysis shows that government subsidies have an incentive effect on carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises. After the market stabilizes, even if the government subsidies are gradually withdrawn, the carbon emissions reduction of supply chain enterprises still converges to Pareto optimal equilibrium. The influence of free riding behavior on supply chain enterprises depends on the carbon emissions reduction profit. When the carbon emissions reduction profit is different, the decision of manufacturers and suppliers will be different. The above conclusions provide a reference for governments to strengthen control or enterprises to make decisions on carbon emissions reduction.

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“…Assumption 2 : Referring to Yu et al (2020) and Meng et al (2021) , the participants in the game are required to share the loss of the liability cost reasonably, and the loss of the liability cost is linearly related (the correlation coefficient is a real number greater than 0). That is, if construction enterprises bear a liability cost loss of C , then the government bears a liability cost loss of kC , where k is the transfer coefficient of the liability cost loss.…”

Section: Construction Safety Supervision Decision-making Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Decision-Making Model for Construction Safety Behavior Supervision: An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Analysis

Ning

et al. 2022

Front. Psychol.

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Without the active participation of enterprises and front-line workers, it is difficult for the government to perform effective supervision to ensure behavioral safety among front-line workers. To overcome inadequate government supervision and information attenuation caused by vertical management mode and limited resources, and to change passive supervision into active control with the proactive participation of enterprises and workers, this paper combines the entity responsibility mechanism and the third-party participation mechanism based on government supervision to analyze the decision-making process of government and enterprises on safety behavior supervision. An evolutionary game model was established to describe the decision-making interactions between the government and construction enterprises under the two mechanisms, and a simulation was performed to illustrate the factors influencing the implementation of the mechanisms. The results show that both mechanisms have a positive effect on government supervision, and the third-party participation mechanism was found to be working better. The implementation of the two mechanisms is influenced by punishment, subsidy, and cost, and it has different sensitivities to the three influencing factors. This study provides a theoretical framework for enhancing the government supervision mechanism, and the decision-making between the government and construction enterprises enhances the management form and guides their actual supervision practices.

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The Tripartite Regulation Game of Carbon Financial Products Based on the Prospect Theory

Cited by 13 publications

References 34 publications

Green and socially responsible finance: past, present and future

Green and socially responsible finance: past, present and future

Research on Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategy Considering Government Subsidy and Free Riding Behavior

Developing a Decision-Making Model for Construction Safety Behavior Supervision: An Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Analysis

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