2012
DOI: 10.1177/0047117812445450
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The Transnational Politics of Warfare Accountability: Human Rights Watch versus the Israel Defense Forces

Abstract: Transnational human rights networks span the globe, and have become more numerous and influential since the 1970s. Yet we still know relatively little about the strategic interaction between transnational advocates and their targeted state actors. Focusing on such a strategic interaction, we argue that transnational advocacy is less a diffusion of authority away from state actors than a change in the ways in which the politics of accountability is conducted between sophisticated state and non-state actors. In … Show more

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Cited by 11 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…This can be explained by the main peculiarity of such conflicts, namely indirect or hidden application of force among states in circumstances of total international legal prohibition of use of force and threat of force. States are forced to be very cautious implementing such activity in order for them not to be blamed for violating international law (Rajkovic and Vennesson, 2012). As an example, we can mention that even the Russian Federation (understanding the lawlessness of its actions) is always trying to present legal arguments in support of its actions which will justify them or at least prove that they do not constitute violation of international law.…”
Section: Lawfare As An Objective International Legalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can be explained by the main peculiarity of such conflicts, namely indirect or hidden application of force among states in circumstances of total international legal prohibition of use of force and threat of force. States are forced to be very cautious implementing such activity in order for them not to be blamed for violating international law (Rajkovic and Vennesson, 2012). As an example, we can mention that even the Russian Federation (understanding the lawlessness of its actions) is always trying to present legal arguments in support of its actions which will justify them or at least prove that they do not constitute violation of international law.…”
Section: Lawfare As An Objective International Legalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From the outset, we should note that HRW's attempt to make the IDF accountable for what it alleged to be violations of international humanitarian law during Operation Cast Lead takes place on a complex, discursive and institutional field involving Israeli political and military agencies, UN officials, human rights advocates, and a cluster of non-state organizations advocating in defence of Israel. Vennesson and Rajkovic (2012) have documented at length how this antagonistic transnational field acquired its present shape in the context of the 2006 war in Southern Lebanon when Israel clashed with Hezbollah. For that war established a pattern in which allegations of war crimes levelled at Israel by human rights groups were met not just by a sophisticated public relations campaign coordinated by the Israeli state in defence of its military actions.…”
Section: Unmanned Aeroplanes At Gazamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time, its military actions may well become potentially exposed to greater scrutiny in terms of the discriminacy norm: greater accuracy in targeting can now be demanded of its armed forces. It may or may not be the case that human rights groups have focused their investigatory powers more intensely on the IDF than on Hamas or Hezbollah (Vennesson and Rajkovic, 2012). What is certain is that the profoundly different and unequal technological and military capabilities of these organizations play a part in shaping the ethical regimes within which they are subjectified.…”
Section: Drones and Dingpolitikmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… 1. Notable exceptions to this include Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) and Vennesson and Rajkovic (2012). As Vennesson and Rajkovic (2012) state, our understanding of the “processes of strategic interaction between transnational advocates and their targeted state actors” is very limited (410). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%