The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation

Beckers, Sander; Vennekens, Joost

doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.001

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…All of these examples are counterexamples to the transitivity of causation. The failure of transitivity has become broadly accepted by now [2]. Despite what Def 8's behavior in these examples might suggest, it is also not transitive.…”

Section: Comparison To Updated Hpmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The first strategy starts with the widely shared intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y (the NESS intuition, from now on). 1,2 Pearl claims that using causal models allows one to make this intuition formally precise, whereas existing logical notions of necessity and sufficiency lack the resources to do so. The second strategy is to demonstrate that his formal account offers intuitive verdicts for a number of problematic examples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

Beckers

2021

J Philos Logic

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Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl’s first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.

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Section: Comparison To Updated Hpmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

Beckers

2021

J Philos Logic

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“…BV show in detail that the same verdict is reached for other examples of early preemption (Beckers and Vennekens 2017). Although BV attempt to justify this verdict by appealing to probabilistic considerations, there is a cheaper -and arguably more compelling -solution: adopt a more subtle counterfactual differencemaking condition.…”

Section: The Cness Definition Of Causationmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Two such definitions have been developed recently by Vennekens and myself (henceforth the BV definition (Beckers and Vennekens 2017) and the BV definition-2 (Beckers and Vennekens 2018)). The proposed definitions by Beckers and Vennekens (BV from now on) distinguish themselves positively from a range of other definitions that are based on that of (Halpern and Pearl 2005) -HP-style definitions -by an explicit focus on certain underlying principles that a definition of causation should satisfy, instead of a focus on the -potentially endless -debate regarding many examples and the intuitions they invoke.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation

Beckers¹

2020

Preprint

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In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach. Structural Equation ModelsThis section reviews the definition of causal models as understood in the structural modeling tradition started by (Pearl 2000). Much of the discussion and notation is taken from (Halpern 2016) with little change.

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“…All of these examples are counterexamples to the transitivity of causation. The failure of transitivity has become broadly accepted by now (Beckers and Vennekens, 2017). Despite what Def 8's behavior in these examples might suggest, it is also not transitive.…”

Section: Comparison To Updated Hpmentioning

confidence: 97%

Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

Beckers¹

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl's first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.

show abstract

The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation

Cited by 10 publications

References 12 publications

Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation

Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation

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