The tragic 1996 Everest expedition: a tale of error culture

Abstract

Error occurrence cannot be fully eliminated. A strict differentiation between errors and their consequences is used to (a) discuss error prevention and error management, and (b) to show how organisations can promote an error mastery culture that combines the best of both. This article uses two 1996 Everest expeditions as an illustration of what can go wrong in complex high-risk systems. The point of this article, however, is not restricted to high-risk industries. A mastery error culture aims at control of negative error consequences − most relevant in high-risk industries − but also fosters positive error consequences needed for adaptation and innovation. The article discusses both general and recent empirical literature on safety, quality and error handling. (Netherlands Journal of Psychology, 65,(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)

Internally Reporting Risk in Financial Services: An Empirical Analysis

“…In contrast, the error reporting literature also argues that the move to punish, and fear thereof, can be considered as a characteristic of a facet-specific 'error-averse management climate' which may be counterproductive to the future reporting of operational risk events (Van Dyck et al 2005;Van Dyck 2009;Gronewold et al 2013;IRM 2012). In addition, the work of Morrison (2011) introduces the notion of the futility of expectation, arguing that an institution will suffer if an individual believes the reporting of events to be futile, particularly first reports, (see also Taylor and Curtis 2010;Van Scotter et al 2005).…”

Fouten kunnen waardevol zijn

“…Zo wordt er vaak gesproken van grote en kleine fouten. Niettemin kan eenzelfde fout leiden tot grote en kleine gevolgen (Van Dyck, 2009a). Zo kan een accountant een analytische procedure verkeerd uitvoeren.…”

“…Deze begrippen komen deels overeen, omdat in beide gevallen met voorbedachten rade een actie wordt ondernomen om een vooraf gesteld doel te bereiken. Echter, bij het maken van een fout is onbedoeld een procedure verkeerd uitgevoerd, een inschattingsfout gemaakt, feedback onjuist geïnterpreteerd of een deel van het plan vergeten (Van Dyck, 2009a). In het geval van een overtreding wordt er doelbewust voor gekozen om van de regels, procedure of norm af te wijken (Van Dyck et al, 2005).…”

The Impact of Error-Management Climate, Error Type and Error Originator on Auditors’ Reporting Errors Discovered on Audit Work Papers

“…Organizational error-management climate comprises shared beliefs, norms, and common practices regarding the management of errors in the organization (Van Dyck et al 2005). Research has shown that organizations differ in their error-management climates, which can be characterized by different degrees of "error management" (Van Dyck 1997 and2009). In the opposite climate, which we call a blame climate (known in the literature as "low error management" or "error aversion"), the above-mentioned practices are only paid "lip service" in the organization (Van Dyck 1997 and2009;Van Dyck et al 2005).…”