Nearly thirty years on from Alberto Coll's call to revive normative prudence as 'a tradition of statecraft,' this paper presents a case for making this virtue key to the debates concerning international interventions and statebuilding. Though prudence has a rich conceptual history, contemporary IR literature seems to have forgotten it. Assessments of recent international interventions use the language of prudential reasoning without making this concept their starting point. Similarly, IR theories engage with the concept of prudence indirectly but they do not acknowledge it explicitly. This paper addresses these gaps by putting forward four yardsticks of prudent statecraft. They include deliberation and reasoning; caution and circumspection; foresight and the ability to imagine the consequences of one's actions; and knowing the limits of one's abilities. These yardsticks are then applied to the cases of the NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) and the American invasion of Iraq ( 2003) to make the following two points. First, we argue that once developed systematically in the context of international interventions, the concept of normative prudence provides a singular platform for assessing interventions. Second, we assert that if employed robustly, normative prudence can help those undertaking these interventions to prepare for the 'day after.'