The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

Eijffinger, Sylvester; Hoeberichts, Marco

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028653

Cited by 63 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 8 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…Globalization in the sense of a reduction of b' does therefore not replace central bank independence, but increases the degree of optimal inflation aversion of the central banker. However, if we depart from the above model and no longer measure central bank independence against b, but against the degree of self-assertion of the central bank, it may in fact be possible to establish the above hypothesis of a decline in the degree of optimum central bank independence with ongoing globalization in the above meaning of equation (19); see Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Wagner (2000a, pp. 379-80).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy

Wagner¹

2001

IMF Working Papers

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Copyright reserved. Subject to the exception provided for by law, no part of this publication may be reproduced and/or published in print, by photocopying, on microfilm or in any other way without the written consent of the copyrightholder(s); the same applied to whole or partial adaptions. The publisher retains the sole right to collect from third parties fees payable in respect of copying and/or take legal or other actions for this purpose. Terms of use: Documents in Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy*Prepared by Helmut Wagner 1 AbstractThis paper argues that the implications of globalization for monetary policy come mainly through two channels: On the one hand, the many structural changes, which are associated with the globalization process, cause an increase in uncertainty surrounding monetary policy. This leads to an increase in uncertainty about how to interpret macroeconomic data/indicators and about the monetary transmission mechanism. On the other hand, by strengthening the process of global economic integration, the globalization process increases international competition. Thereby, globalization forces market players to make structural adjustments or reforms which change the conditions or constraints under which monetary policy is implemented.JEL Classification Numbers: E5, F0, F4

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confidence: 99%

Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy

Wagner¹

2001

IMF Working Papers

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“…Having in mind the above-listed examples, it becomes obvious that the central bank independence and conservatism are rather complementary concepts than terms with the same meaning. It should be noted that some authors describe the independence and conservatism as substitutes (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 1998). In any event, it seems undeniable that the independence and conservatism are two different terms, which should not be attributed the same or similar meaning.…”

Section: Politička Samostalnostmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Već iz nekoliko navedenih primera, postaje očigledno je da su samostalnost i konzervativnost centralne banke u većoj meri komplementarni nego što su pojmovi sa identičnim značenjem. Treba reći i da pojedini autori samostalnost i konzervativnost vide i kao supstitute (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 1998). U svakom slučaju, deluje nesporno da su samostalnost i konzervativnost dva različita pojma, kojima ne bi trebalo pripisivati isto ili slično značenje.…”

Section: Historical Development Of the Theoretical Concept Of Centralunclassified

Theoretical concept of Central Bank independence and legal status of the National Bank of Serbia

Ilić¹

2017

Bankarstvo

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Prevod obezbedio autor RezimeSavremena teorijska koncepcija samostalnosti centralne banke od ključnog je značaja za formiranje institucionalnih aranžmana koji se odnose na monetarnu vlast. Teorijski je utvrđeno i empirijski verifikovano da centralna banka može da funkcioniše efikasno samo ukoliko je obezbeđena njena institucionalna samostalnost. U prvom delu rada je izložena savremena teorijska koncepcija samostalnosti, dok se u drugom delu rada razmatraju pozitivni pravni propisi kojima je definisan institucionalni okvir i pravni status Narodne banke Srbije. Poređenjem formalnog i faktičkog statusa koji trenutno uživa Narodna banka Srbije sa institucionalnim aranžmanima koji su rezultat praktične primene teorijske koncepcije samostalnosti, autor je zauzeo kritički stav prema domaćem institucionalnom okviru. Adekvatna zakonska rešenja su istaknuta u radu, a istovremeno su predložene i odgovarajuće izmene onih rešenja koja nedvosmisleno narušavaju institucionalnu samostalnost Narodne banke Srbije.Ključne reči: Narodna banka Srbije, centralna banka, institucionalna samostalnost, monetarna vlast JEL: E42, E58 Primljen: 12.04.2017. Prihvaćen: 01.06.2017 SummaryThe modern theoretical concept of independence is crucial for the establishment of institutional arrangements relating to monetary authority. It is theoretically demonstrated and empirically verified that a central bank can function effectively only if it is provided with institutional independence. The modern theoretical concept of central bank independence is presented in the first part of the paper, while the second part deals with applicable legislation defining the institutional framework and legal status of the National Bank of Serbia. By juxtaposing the formal and factual status currently afforded to the National Bank of Serbia with institutional arrangements derived from the practical application of the theoretical concept of independence, the author takes a critical position toward the domestic institutional framework. The adequate legal solutions are highlighted in the paper while, at the same time, the appropriate amendments are suggested for the solutions that clearly violate the institutional independence of the National Bank of Serbia. Keywords UvodTeorijska koncepcija samostalnosti je u velikoj meri oblikovala moderne institucionalne aranžmane koji se odnose na centralnu banku. Zahvaljujući teorijskim i empirijskim istraživanjima, koja ukazuju na značajnu ulogu koju centralna banka ima u razvijenim tržišnim privredama, u velikom broju država usvojena su nova zakonska rešenja koja omogućavaju formiranje boljih institucionalnih okvira. Prema Cukiermanu (1996), samo u periodu od 1989. do 1996. godine, dvadeset pet država suštinski je unapredilo samostalnost sopstvene centralne banke.Kako bi se u potpunosti razumela savremena teorijska koncepcija samostalnosti centralne banke, neophodno je analizirati njene korene, to jest uz upotrebu znanja iz ekonomske istorije analizirati najbitnije nalaze na osnovu kojih je ova koncepcija nastala. Taj pristup ...

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“…Independence and conservativeness become the conditions to implement credible non-inflationary monetary policies. The trade-off between conservativeness and independence (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 1998) can be addressed using Independence as a tool to implement conservative monetary policies. But the private agents trusts the central banker only if effective rules on accountability and transparency hold.…”

Section: Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governancementioning

confidence: 99%