The topology of persons, and surviving to some degree

Abstract

Braddon-Mitchell and Miller put forward the claim that the relation of being-the-same-person is gradable: a person can be the same person tomorrow as today, but only half the same. To justify their thesis, they propose a model of persons that is intended to be metaphysically neutral. This article sets out to show that such a model implicitly contains strong metaphysical assumptions that run contrary to the authors’ own statements. Using Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology, we aim to demonstrate that within the model in question persons exist intentionally, where this leads to a caricature rather than an adequate account of persons. In opposition to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, we argue that the justification presented for the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person in fact makes it reasonable to demand that an adequate model of persons be posited. We present Kurt Lewin’s holistic topological-dynamic model, and show that in this context it is not being-the-same-person that is gradable, but rather the characteristic (of persons) that is dimension. Thus, we reject the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person involved in personal identity.