The Time of Experience and the Experience of Time

Abstract

Philosophers have usually approached the concept of timing of experiences by addressing the question how the experiences of temporal phenomena can be explained. As a result, the issue of timing has been addressed in two different ways. The first, similar to the questions posed in sciences, concerns the relationship between the experienced time of events and the objective time of events. The second approach is more specific to philosophers' debates, and concerns the phenomenology of experiences: how is the apparent temporal structure of experiences constituted? In regard to both questions, this article shows why and how philosophers' views differ from those held by most scientists. To conclude, I present a combination of views that is not only compatible with that of scientists, but also addresses the problems that engage philosophers.

Physical Time Within Human Time

“…Further analysis of that hierarchy of temporality is provided by Montemayor and Wittmann (2014) who emphasize that the continuity of experience (requiring working memory) involves multiple seconds to generate a platform for the narrative self. It is important to note that these intervals comprising the temporality experience are part of the “succession of experiences” ( Arstila, 2016 ). Moreover, there is an additional overlaying “experience of succession” [also known as the “feeling of succession” ( Hoerl, 2013 ) for at least the first three zones].…”

“…To argue that there is an illusory aspect to temporality consider the thought experiment of C.D. Broad (1923 ; see also Montemayor, 2009 , 2012 ; Arstila, 2016 ). When looking at the big hand of a clock there is an experience of succession and also a succession of experiences as it moves along passing the numbers on the dial.…”

“…It is helpful to contrast the experience of succession to that of motion. Arstila (2016 , 2018) notes that both are experiences that are said not to extend time and are part of his “snapshot theory.” He refers to the illusory experience associated with “pure motion” and then notes that the same can be said of succession, referring to it as “pure succession.” Both serve the same purpose for human adaption by providing a continuity for events and an assumption of “sameness” or persistence which is contrary to the physics view.…”

Rethinking the Specious Present

“…6 Something similar is briefly outlined by Robin Le Poidevin (2007: 88-92), who also makes a similar appeal to the waterfall illusion (see below). While writing this chapter, subsequent to completing Prosser 2016 (in which I also used the name 'dynamic snapshot theory'), I discovered that Valtteri Arstila (2016) has also used the same name for a similar view (Arstila's ambitions for the dynamic snapshot theory appear to be a little more extensive than mine; but he does not distinguish sharply between continuous and discontinuous change, so I'm not certain of his view regarding the latter. Arstila also has an interesting take on the much-discussed 'postdiction' phenomena.)…”

Defense of the brain time view

“…This notion is rarely explicitly endorsed—something along these lines has been presented in relation to the postdiction effects (e.g., Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000 , 2007 ; Grush, 2005 , 2006 )—and even more rarely explicated. Thus, the notion remains under-described, both theoretically and in neural terms (e.g., Arnold, 2010 ; Arstila, 2015 ).…”