The Tibetan Self-Immolations as Counter-Securitization: Towards an Inter-Unit Theory of Securitization

Topgyal, Tsering

doi:10.1080/14799855.2016.1227323

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 13 publications

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“…127-128;Danner 2014); but the importance of pre-emptive desecuritisation has also been mentioned (Weaver 1995: p. 60;Bourbeau and Vuori 2015). Apart from desecuritisation, the reverse securitisation, that is a securitisation of the securitising actor back (Vuori 2018: p. 120), as well as counter-securitisation, that is resistance to securitisation (Topgyal 2016;Vuori 2011), can be answers to the securitisation moves. Most importantly, some argue that successful desecuritisation is only possible by nontalking (lack of speech acts), rather than presenting oneself as non-threatening in response to securitisation (Behnke 2006: p. 65).…”

Section: Desecuritisation As a Soft Power Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Desecuritisation as a soft power strategy: the Belt and Road Initiative, European fragmentation and China’s normative influence in Central-Eastern Europe

Jakimów

2019

Asia Eur J

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While much discussion centres on economic properties and political challenges of implementing the China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), few studies investigate the subtle connections between the narratives of the BRI and the political transformations in the regions en route of the project. Through a critique of the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation, this paper brings together the analysis of Chinese, Central-Eastern European (CEE) and the core EU governments' ideas and perceptions of the BRI and assesses what they mean for the future of the European Union's political and normative cohesion. This paper argues that the China-deployed desecuritised narratives of the BRI constitute an important soft power strategy of China in its engagement in Europe. The article illustrates how these desecuritised narratives are utilised and coproduced actively by countries of CEE with a political aim of negotiating their domestic interests with the EU's institutions, making the process of desecuritisation neither apolitical nor benign. As China-promoted desecuritisation is used instrumentally by the regional actors to present China as an economic, political and normative alternative to the EU, the article contributes to the understanding of China's desecuritisation as a soft power strategy, which is both forged through 'negative' language (Callahan, Politics 35(3-4):216-229, 2015) and is 'contingent' upon recipient audiences (Kavalski, Coop Confl 48(2):247-267, 2013). As a result, new regional dynamics emerge in the EU, which are driven by the populist turn and growing demand for Chinese investments in the European periphery, which China skilfully utilises through narratives of desecuritisation in order to boost its soft power strategy in the region.

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Section: Desecuritisation As a Soft Power Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Desecuritisation as a soft power strategy: the Belt and Road Initiative, European fragmentation and China’s normative influence in Central-Eastern Europe

Jakimów

2019

Asia Eur J

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The Authoritarian Persistence

Reimer-Burgrova¹

2021

Politics of Violence and Fear in MENA

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Securitisation gaps: Towards ideational understandings of state weakness

Oskanian

2021

Eur. j. of int. secur.

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This article contributes a securitisation-based, interpretive approach to state weakness. The long-dominant positivist approaches to the phenomenon have been extensively criticised for a wide range of deficiencies. Responding to Lemay-Hébert's suggestion of a ‘Durkheimian’, ideational-interpretive approach as a possible alternative, I base my conceptualisation on Migdal's view of state weakness as emerging from a ‘state-in-society's’ contested ‘strategies of survival’. I argue that several recent developments in Securitisation Theory enable it to capture this contested ‘collective knowledge’ on the state: a move away from state-centrism, the development of a contextualised ‘sociological’ version, linkages made between securitisation and legitimacy, and the acknowledgment of ‘securitisations’ as a contested Bourdieusian field. I introduce the concept of ‘securitisation gaps’ – divergences in the security discourses and practices of state and society – as a concept aimed at capturing this contested role of the state, operationalised along two logics (reactive/substitutive) – depending on whether they emerge from securitisations of the state action or inaction – and three intensities (latent, manifest, and violent), depending on the extent to which they involve challenges to state authority. The approach is briefly illustrated through the changing securitisation gaps in the Republic of Lebanon during the 2019–20 ‘October Uprising’.

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The Tibetan Self-Immolations as Counter-Securitization: Towards an Inter-Unit Theory of Securitization

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Desecuritisation as a soft power strategy: the Belt and Road Initiative, European fragmentation and China’s normative influence in Central-Eastern Europe

Desecuritisation as a soft power strategy: the Belt and Road Initiative, European fragmentation and China’s normative influence in Central-Eastern Europe

The Authoritarian Persistence

Securitisation gaps: Towards ideational understandings of state weakness

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