The Thin Moral Concept of Evil

Abstract

Evil-scepticism comes in two varieties: one variety is descriptive, where it is claimed that the concept of evil does not successfully denote anything in the world; the other variety is normative, where it is claimed that the concept of evil is not a helpful or useful concept to be employing in either our social or interpersonal lives. This paper argues that evil-scepticism can be responded to by understanding the concept of evil as a thin moral concept. Understood in this thin way, the descriptive challenge fades, because the concept of evil does not even purport to denote anything in the world (it is purely evaluative), and so does the normative argument, since the thinness of the concept means that, first, it is ineliminable anyway, and, second, its malleability allows for it to be used for progressive and constructive means.

Frame Modeling of The Linguocultural Concept “Religion”

“…-Formerly, when religion was strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now, when science is strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic. "Before, when religion was strong and science weak, people mistook magic for medicine; now that science is strong and religion is weak, people mistake medicine for magic [19].…”

“…It has now been renamed Deseret and is part of the United States of America. It will have its own flag, its own judicial system, its own state religion, its own great and secret purpose [19].…”

“…-President Ben Ali said that there is no place for a religious political party in Tunisia because 'the religion of Islam is one for all and it cannot compete or compete, much less be a way to come to power'. He added that the only defender of Islam in Tunisia was the state itself [19].…”

“…And religion, torn off from morality, is like ringing brass, it only makes noise. But the question arises whether it is possible to say about any morality that it cannot be separated from religion [19].…”