The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited

Hsiao, Jony

doi:10.1086/260375

Cited by 37 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Moreover, there is inefficiency not simply from the perspective of an omniscient economist interested in resource allocation but also more directly from the perspective of an individual sharecropper and individual landowner. Since S̄ F > S̄ S from (20), a landowner and a cultivator who have provisionally agreed to a sharecropping contract could, as Hsiao (1975) observed, switch to a fixed rent contract that would be better for both. That is, there exists a range of fixed rents that would exceed and would leave the cultivator (who would use a labour input l̄ F ) with a pure profit greater than 6…”

Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure

Commendatore¹,

Currie

2006

Metroeconomica

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This paper explores a dynamic model of an agricultural sector in which farms are leased to cultivators on fixed rent contracts or on sharecropping contracts and in which cultivators are subject to credit rationing by banks. The model, which can exhibit complex dynamics, is used to compare the two pure forms of land tenure and to explore some implications of the coexistence of both types of tenure. The central conclusion from the dynamic simulations is that, contrary to the conventional proposition based on static analysis, both landowners and cultivators may be better-off under sharecropping.

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Section: Theoretical Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure

Commendatore¹,

Currie

2006

Metroeconomica

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“…That above support to the sugar industry is complemented by a requirement that land previously leased for sugar can only be used to produce cane, thereby further discouraging other farm industries in Fiji (Kurer, 2001; Lal et al., 2001; Prasad & Tisdell, 1996). In theory, land leasing need not be a constraint on efficient farm production (Hsiao, 1975; Otsuka et al., 1992). But it is if—as in Fiji—there are restrictions on the use of the land, if the security of the lease is uncertain, and if the land tenure system makes it difficult to reap economies of size or use that land as collateral for credit.…”

Section: Structure Of Industry Assistance Within the Farm Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Repurposing agricultural support policies for shared prosperity in rural Fiji

Anderson

2023

Asia & Pacific Policy Stud

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Notwithstanding the increasing place of tourism exports, the rural sector and its agricultural production remain important contributors to Fijiʼs economy. But their contribution is compromised by policies and institutions that distort the farm sectorʼs resource use, with too many resources employed by sugar and livestock producers at the expense of other farmers and producers of non‐farm products. Subsidies to the sugar industry could be used instead to boost investment in rural public goods such as infrastructure and agricultural research. That would benefit a much larger proportion of rural people, many of whom are below the poverty line. So too would a lowering of tariffs on imports of meat and milk products. And by thereby lowering food prices in urban areas, such re‐purposing of support would benefit their poorest households most. It would also lower the prices of high‐protein livestock products and nutrient‐rich fruits and vegetables, which could well improve nutrition and health.

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“…2 Marginal analysis of Marshallian style tends to suggest that sharecroppers may be less efficient than owner-cultivators (e.g., Bardhan and Srinivasan, 1971) and that fixed-rent tenants may be as efficient as owner-cultivators. Nevertheless, some economists (e.g., Johnson, 1950;Cheung, 1969;Reid, 1973;Hsiao, 1975;etc. ) argue that all systems are equally efficient.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan

Huang¹

1991

Agricultural Economics

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121Huang, C.H., 1991. Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan.Agric. Econ., 5: 121-133.Fixed-rent tenancy was traditionally regarded as equally efficient as owner-cultivators. The counter-example is, however, presented here. Specifically, tenants with fixed-rent contracts and well protected by tenancy regulations may, in the long run, tum out to be less efficient than other farmers (e.g., owner-cultivators and informal tenants), particularly when they do not heavily depend on farm revenue as major source of family income. On the other hand, tenants who are not benefited from tenancy regulations might not be less efficient than owner-cultivators. The underlying implication is tenancy reform is not a panacea for improving farming efficiency; it may result in many negative effects in the long run.

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The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited

Cited by 37 publications

References 3 publications

A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure

A Dynamical Analysis of Alternative Forms of Agricultural Land Tenure

Repurposing agricultural support policies for shared prosperity in rural Fiji

Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan

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