The territorial foundations of human property

DeScioli, Peter; Wilson, Bart J.

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.10.003

Cited by 84 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…15 Empirical evidence from a broad range of species shows that the average length of resource contests is decreasing in the relative asymmetry of the competitors (Arnott and Elwood, 2009). Finally, several recent experimental studies have also documented that increasing players' asymmetry reduces effort expenditures in diverse competitive environments (Fonseca, 2009;Anderson and Freeborn, 2010;DeScioli and Wilson, 2011). …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, many superficially mystifying practices that appear absurd to modern eyes can be revealed to serve as conflict resolution mechanisms. It is also important to emphasize that the random device is most successful in resolving conflicts between relatively symmetric agents, which according to prior research tend to engage in more costly conflicts than more asymmetric agents (Davis and Reilly, 1998;Fonseca, 2009;Anderson and Freeborn, 2010;DeScioli and Wilson, 2011).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents

Kimbrough

Sheremeta

Shields

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by fair coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. The model predicts that "parity promotes peace": in the pure-strategy equilibrium, agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by using a random device; however, with sufficiently asymmetric capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. The results of the experiment confirm that the availability of the random device partially eliminates conflicts when agents are relatively symmetric; however, the device also reduces conflict between substantially asymmetric agents.JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72, D74

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents

Kimbrough

Sheremeta

Shields

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Echoing the findings of empirical studies, experimental studies find significant support for strategic momentum (Mago et al, 2013;Irfanoglu et al, 2015). Also, consistent with the theory, conflicts escalate with the introduction of intermediate rewards (Mago et al, 2013;Gelder and Kovenock, 2017), and asymmetric contests tend to be resolved in favor of the contestant with the advantage (DeScioli and Wilson, 2011;Oprea et al, 2013). However, contrary to the theoretical prediction of frontloading, conflicts tend to last too long and remain intense in the latter stages (Zizzo, 2002;Hörisch and Kirchkamp, 2010;Deck and Sheremeta, 2012;Deck and Kimbrough, 2015), though Ryvkin (2011) finds some evidence of conflict fatigue.…”

Section: War Of Attrition Games: Dynamic Contest Modelsmentioning

confidence: 53%

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Kimbrough

Laughren

Sheremeta

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.JEL classifications: D72, D74, F51, F52, F54, H56, N4, Q34

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“…When there is perfect information and the costs of conflict are relatively high, settlements are likely to occur according to certain asymmetries between the contestants [30,31]. However, when there is uncertainty and differences are hard to detect, conflicts are more likely to ensue as the contestants uncover who is stronger (or more aggressive) and who is weaker [32,33].…”

Section: The Evolutionary Biology Perspective On Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study of the Triggers of Conflict and Emotional Reactions

Caldara

McBride

McCarter

et al. 2017

Games

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Abstract:We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are often triggered by fear. Finally, evolutionary biologists suggest that a third trigger is uncertainty about an opponent's desire to cause harm. Consistent with the predictions from economics, social psychology, and evolutionary biology, we find that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not the intensity. Also, we find that the frequency and intensity of conflict decrease positive emotions and increase negative emotions and that conflict impacts negative emotions more than positive emotions.

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The territorial foundations of human property

Cited by 84 publications

References 20 publications

When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents

When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

A Study of the Triggers of Conflict and Emotional Reactions

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