2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00423.x
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The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits*

Abstract: Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact on scholar's productivity, leading to higher productivity growth rates and higher productivity levels. JEL Classification Numbers: A11, A14, C79.

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Cited by 20 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…These species face selective pressures from their local ecological (i.e., game or paradigm) environments, in which fitness advantages of some ideas and theories will be tested for their strategic advantage in those games. Games often incentivize development of habits that are productive for a species or group, such as academic habits that lead a tenured professor to continue being productive rather than resting on already accomplished laurels (Faria & Monteiro, 2008).…”
Section: The Evolutionary Implications For the Fieldmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…These species face selective pressures from their local ecological (i.e., game or paradigm) environments, in which fitness advantages of some ideas and theories will be tested for their strategic advantage in those games. Games often incentivize development of habits that are productive for a species or group, such as academic habits that lead a tenured professor to continue being productive rather than resting on already accomplished laurels (Faria & Monteiro, 2008).…”
Section: The Evolutionary Implications For the Fieldmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The game features of several academic processes have already been explored, including government regulation of higher education (Kauko & Niklasson, 1996), science education (Clough, 2000), higher education governance (Greenhalgh, 2015), university branding (Aula, Tienari & Waeraas, 2015), faculty development (Lee & McWilliam, 2008), ethical decision making (Medeiros et al, 2015), gender performance and leadership in higher education (Acker, 2010), graduate student seminar socialization (Fejes, Johansson, & Dahlgren, 2005), medical school recruitment and education (Brosnan, 2010;Hill, Bowman, Stalmeijer, & Hart, 2014), and the move to metricization (Grant & Fogatry, 1998;Kelly & Burrows, 2012) or audit culture (Spurling, 2015) in faculty evaluation. Related game-theoretic analyses have been applied to student acculturation to higher education (Bathmaker, Ingram, & Waller, 2013;Tønseth, 2015), tenure (Chatteree & Marshall, 2014;Grubbs & Taylor, 2013), publishing (Faria, 2005) post-tenure activities (Faria & Monteiro, 2008) and scientific norms of theory choice (Zamora-Bonilla, 2010).…”
Section: Let the Games Begin: Future Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Coupe, Smeets, and Warzynski (2006) present evidence that economists have strong incentives to be productive researchers early in their careers, but that the incentives weaken after advancement. On the other hand, Faria and Monteiro (2008) postulate that tenure standards generate efficient habits for all scholarly activities early in the career and that these habits persist post-promotion. Siow (1998) argues that professors with high research output are more likely to attract outside offers, suggesting that research incentives and rewards are strong even after advancement.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The relationship between incentives for publication and the quality of research has been studied by Faria (2005), within the framework of a differential game between authors and editors, and by Faria and Monteiro (2005) as a differential game between scholars and the head of research (the department). In these papers, appropriate incentives for publication (for instance, as a criteria for tenure) are shown to have a globally positive impact on the quality of academic research, justified by journal reputation building in the former paper, or by research habit formation in the latter.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%