2007
DOI: 10.1162/wash.2007.30.3.37
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The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa

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Cited by 128 publications
(82 citation statements)
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“…Evidently, the range of drivers of Chinese investments in Africa, with particular reference to Kenya, is not confined to asset or resource seeking as suggested 27 in some of the literature (e.g. Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013), or political intention as contended by Gill and Reilly (2007). In reality, the organisations see themselves as competitors, even more so if they are in the same industry, bidding for the same project contracts.…”
Section: Re-examining Presumed Homogeneitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Evidently, the range of drivers of Chinese investments in Africa, with particular reference to Kenya, is not confined to asset or resource seeking as suggested 27 in some of the literature (e.g. Drogendijk and Blomkvist, 2013), or political intention as contended by Gill and Reilly (2007). In reality, the organisations see themselves as competitors, even more so if they are in the same industry, bidding for the same project contracts.…”
Section: Re-examining Presumed Homogeneitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, Africa has previously played a key role in supporting China's quest for soft power (Snow, 1988). Thus, observers contend that China's involvement in Africa is politically motivated (Gill and Reilly, 2007), and lopsided, favouring the much more politically and economically powerful China (e.g. Foster et al, 2008;Kamoche, 2011).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, SOEs often have non-economic goals that distinguish them from profit-maximizing private business (Ellstrand, Tiyanyi, & Johnson, 2002). The political agenda of the state may compel SOEs to engage in risky FDI to fulfil political missions, such as securing energy to fuel domestic economic growth, accessing advanced technologies, and increasing geopolitical influence (Chen, 2008;Gill & Reilly, 2007). Therefore, SOEs' FDI could operate as the spearheads of a developmental and geopolitical vision that emanates primarily from the central state (Gozales-Vincente, 2001).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is a major conundrum for the Chinese government wishing, as it does, to safeguard Beijing's image abroad as a 'responsible power' and it is not restricted to Sino-African relations. China's corporate engagement with Africa has thus been exaggerated whilst the 'China Inc. model' is far less efficient and monolithic than is often assumed 148 . There is also the increasing presence of smaller, provincially backed companies operating overseas.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…McGregor 150 reports, for example, that a range of diplomatic scholars in Beijing have recently noted how the SOE's have often 'hijacked' China's diplomatic initiatives in Africa (especially in Sudan), pursuing profit at the expense of broader national interests. These oversight agencies do not enjoy direct lines of authority over Chinese corporations overseas: "As it deepens, the Chinese government will more likely find itself hamstrung by…an increasing set of tensions and contradictions between the interests and aims of government principals-the bureaucracies based in Beijing tasked with advancing China's overall national interests-and the aims and interests of ostensible agents-the companies and businesspersons operating on the ground in Africa" 151 .…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%