The Syllogism of Neuro-Economics

Padoa-Schioppa, Camillo

doi:10.1017/s0266267108002071

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…As noted above, valuation is inconsistent. In order to understand the underlying microeconomics of decision making, we need to take into account the information processing that underlies decision making in humans and other animals (Padoa-Schioppa 2008; Rangel et al 2008; Redish 2013). We can explain the inconsistency of valuation through these separate information processing algorithms, each of which provide a different path to motivation and valuation.…”

Section: Is Value Still a Valuable Hypothetical Construct?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Computational Complexity of Valuation and Motivational Forces in Decision-Making Processes

Redish

Schultheiss

Carter

2015

Behavioral Neuroscience of Motivation

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The concept of value is fundamental to most theories of motivation and decision making. However, value has to be measured experimentally. Different methods of measuring value produce incompatible valuation hierarchies. Taking the agent’s perspective (rather than the experimenter’s), we interpret the different valuation measurement methods as accessing different decision-making systems and show how these different systems depend on different information processing algorithms. This identifies the translation from these multiple decision-making systems into a single action taken by a given agent as one of the most important open questions in decision making today. We conclude by looking at how these different valuation measures accessing different decision-making systems can be used to understand and treat decision dysfunction such as in addiction.

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Section: Is Value Still a Valuable Hypothetical Construct?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Computational Complexity of Valuation and Motivational Forces in Decision-Making Processes

Redish

Schultheiss

Carter

2015

Behavioral Neuroscience of Motivation

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“…In neuroeconomic literature, we can find many examples that appear to refer to type identity theory (or, at least, that appear to indicate an adherence to it by neuroeconomists). For example, let us consider the so-called “syllogism of neuroeconomics” proposed by the neuroscientist Padoa-Schioppa (2008, p. 451):…”

Section: The Relevance Of Mind–brain Identity Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although Padoa-Schioppa (2008, pp. 450–451) declares himself unsympathetic with reductionism, if we accept that a mental property is (identical with) a neural one (and that the distinction of neuroscience and psychology is arguably fictitious), we must also accept that the mental is in principle reducible to the neural (and that cognitive psychology’s theories can be reduced to neuroscience’s theories) at the ontological and/or at the explanatory level.…”

Section: The Relevance Of Mind–brain Identity Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Neuroeconomics, identity theory, and the issue of correlation

Dico

2013

Theory & Psychology

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Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary approach that combines cognitive psychology, economics, and neurobiology in studying how people make decisions. A peculiar feature of this approach is the use of neuroscientific methods for individuating the neural correlates of the cognitive processes involved in decision-making. The rationale motivating this use is that neurobiology can provide physical evidence for theoretical and abstract constructs that define the cognitive processes responsible for the human deliberative capacity. In this contribution, I’ll provide a critical account of the above assumption. I’ll argue that, in order to consider neurobiological data as reliable empirical evidence for decision-making theories, neuroeconomists need to adopt a very strong assumption about the relation of brain activity to mental states: mind–body identity theory. Without such an assumption, we should consider these data only in terms of correlation and thus too loose to be truly informative.

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The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy

Petracca

2022

Economics and Philosophy

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The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assumptions are necessary to explain real-world value-based decisions. Second, we show that the good-based model’s presumption of introducing a normative neural definition of economic choice would arbitrarily restrict the domain of economic choice and consequently of economics.

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The Syllogism of Neuro-Economics

Cited by 10 publications

References 23 publications

The Computational Complexity of Valuation and Motivational Forces in Decision-Making Processes

The Computational Complexity of Valuation and Motivational Forces in Decision-Making Processes

Neuroeconomics, identity theory, and the issue of correlation

The utility of goods or actions? A neurophilosophical assessment of a recent neuroeconomic controversy

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