The Swiss Binding Say-on-Pay: The Pros and Cons

Nyukorong, Remy

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2342725

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 23 publications

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“…However, following a 2013 referendum, which attracted significant attention from the media, the Swiss federal government is in the final stages of introducing mandatory voting on the election of the board of directors as well as the proposed executive pay arrangements. These changes will significantly affect corporate governance arrangements for Swiss firms and will lead to a power transfer from the boardroom to shareholders (Nyukorong, ). Hausmann and Bechtold‐Orth () express concerns that obliging the shareholders of Swiss firms to actively monitor and engage with their firms significantly increases shareholder responsibility, with important legal consequences.…”

Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Stathopoulos¹,

Voulgaris²

2015

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type Review Research Question/Issue This study focuses on the role of Say‐on‐Pay as a mechanism that aims to promote the efficiency of corporate governance by providing an additional channel for the expression of shareholder “voice.” Initially introduced in the UK, Say‐on‐Pay has subsequently been adopted in a large number of countries and it has recently received significant attention from regulators, media, and the general public. The purpose of this study is to review prior literature related to Say‐on‐Pay and its impact on firm value and corporate decision making. Research Findings/Insights Our study highlights the interdisciplinary nature of research on Say‐on‐Pay. We also shed light on conceptual gaps and empirical discrepancies in prior studies, indicating that many questions linked to Say‐on‐Pay and its importance for the executive pay‐setting process remain largely unanswered. Theoretical/Academic Implications At a theoretical level, we highlight potential areas for development of the existing theoretical framework for Say‐on‐Pay, which is at present rather limited and primarily influenced by agency theory. At an empirical level, we propose a substantial number of avenues for fruitful future research on this topic. Practitioner/Policy Implications In the light of recent proposals for extending the role of Say‐on‐Pay within the corporate governance framework, our findings are particularly relevant to regulators. More thought is needed about changing its nature from advisory to binding, as the degree of its effectiveness and the dynamics of the voting process are still unclear. Our study could also be informative for the media and the general public, especially given the increasing attention afforded to Say‐on‐Pay.

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Section: Say‐on‐paymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Stathopoulos¹,

Voulgaris²

2015

Corporate Governance

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Swiss referendum: Say-on-pay

Albrecht¹

2015

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This paper examines the recent Swiss referendum on say-on-pay. The referendum was put to popular vote in March of 2013, and the Swiss citizens passed the referendum with a clear majority. This paper will explain each of the provisions of the referendum. It will then explain pros and cons of the referendum, and then further evaluate the provisions. Finally, a brief commentary will be made regarding its implication and potential application in the world’s financial centers.

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The Swiss Binding Say-on-Pay: The Pros and Cons

Cited by 2 publications

References 23 publications

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

The Importance of Shareholder Activism: The Case of Say‐on‐Pay

Swiss referendum: Say-on-pay

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