Enacted in 2008, 60 years after Israel Defense Forces was established, the Israeli Reserves Law is a striking expression of the decline of military autonomy in a democratic country. While not aimed at reducing the military’s discretion in regard to the training, deployment, and compensation for reservists, the formal enactment of the Law in effect did so. The legislative process was preceded by a crisis between reservists and the military and was led by several reservists’ organizations who tried to improve the standing and resources allocated to the reserve forces. The article analyzes the impact of these organizations and the coalitions they created with politicians serving in the national parliament, the Knesset. By choosing the legislative option to improve the conditions of service for reservists, they de facto reduced military autonomy since the new Law mandated supervision and monitoring (by civilian institutions) of the service of reservists and extended into the core area of military action, the operational use of force. Thus, the actions of reservists’ organizations turned a bilateral tie between the military and its (reserve) soldiers into a trilateral one, comprising the military, reserve soldiers, and state institutions.