The sustainability of the commons: giving and receiving

Osés‐Eraso, Nuria; Viladrich-Grau, Montserrat

doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9276-6

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…First, it was the first to use a nonlinear payoff function for a CPR experiment. Since the procedure for experiments with nonlinear payoff functions is complicated, many experimental social scientists still use linear payoff functions (Noussair et al 2011;Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 2011;Botelho et al 2014;Becchetti et al 2015), although some do use nonlinear functions 600 Tatsuyoshi Saijo et al (Rodriguez-Sickert et al 2008;Vyrastekova and Van Soest 2008;Hayo and Vollan 2012;Cason and Gangadharan 2014). Second, the number of appropriators is eight in their experiments, which is unusually high for CPR experiments.…”

Section: Example 1 (The Wgo Model)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Common-pool resources are intrinsically unstable

Saijo

Jun

Kobayashi

2017

International Journal of the Commons

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Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish. In addition, we find that a system of a common-pool resource is locally unstable if there are four or more appropriators. Such instability most likely makes efficiency worse than that in the Nash equilibrium. These results indicate that equilibrium analyses might not capture the essence of the common-pool resource problem. They may also provide an answer to the unexplained pulsing behavior among appropriators and inefficiency observed in experiments.Keywords: Appropriation problem, best-response dynamics, common-pool resources, experiment, instability, Nash equilibrium, pulsing behavior Acknowledgement: We thank Professor James Walker for providing us with the individual data of the experiments in Walker et al. 1990. We also thank Y. Kamijo and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that helped to improve the manuscript.

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Section: Example 1 (The Wgo Model)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Common-pool resources are intrinsically unstable

Saijo

Jun

Kobayashi

2017

International Journal of the Commons

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“…The latter is particularly concerning for Fridays for Future activists. Today, the number of inter-generational CPR experiments has grown large enough to identify different subfields, addressing (1) resource-specific parameters (Fischer et al 2004), (2) heterogeneous externalities (Janssen et al 2011;Gampfer 2014), (3) institutional differences (Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau 2011;Hauser et al 2014;Delaney and Jacobson 2016;De Geest et al 2017), (4) communication (Lopez and Villamayor-Tomas 2017), and (5) other-regarding preferences (Sadrieh et al 2003;Velez et al 2009;Grolleau et al 2016). Although the above cited studies differ in specific aspects, they share a stylized resource utilization model with the following features:…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

If future generations had a say: An experiment on fair sharing of a common-pool resource across generations

Farjam¹,

Wolf²

2021

Preprint

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Through an online experiment with 682 participants, we test how inter-generational resource sharing is affected by granting veto power to later generations. We specifically study the over-use of a common-pool resource (CPR) by early generations at the expense of later generations and examine how the veto empowerment of later generations can be used to restrain egoistic tendencies. We compare sequential ultimatum and dictator games of various lengths and find that (1) the CPR consumption of early generations does not depend on the number of generations that follow them; (2) the veto empowerment of later generations leads to a fairer, but ultimately less efficient use of the CPR across generations; and (3) the vetoes are used more carefully if not only previous generations, but also future generations that do not yet have access to the resource are affected by the veto.

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“…By contrast, the management of many common pool resources (especially renewable ones, such as fish) is inherently dynamic. As a result, researchers have begun using resource stocks that evolve over time [4][5][6][7][8][9][10]. However, the focus is often on the exogenous factors affecting group-level outcomes rather than on individual decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterizing Actions in a Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game

Somasse

Smith

Chapman

2018

Games

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We conducted a dynamic common pool resource experiment and found large differences among groups in the total benefits (surplus) obtained from the resource. To shed light on the factors underlying the differences, we characterized individual appropriation decisions as irresponsible, sustainable, or constructive, and defined a measure of the intensity of such actions. We then examined the relationships between group-level success and the frequency and intensity of the individual actions, finding that the average intensity of irresponsible actions was the best predictor of group success. We interpreted this as suggestive evidence that policies aimed at preserving and maximizing the benefits of renewable resources should above all else aim to reduce the intensity of irresponsible actions.

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The sustainability of the commons: giving and receiving

Cited by 14 publications

References 35 publications

Common-pool resources are intrinsically unstable

Common-pool resources are intrinsically unstable

If future generations had a say: An experiment on fair sharing of a common-pool resource across generations

Characterizing Actions in a Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game

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