The Supply of Informal International Governance

Abstract

States increasingly favor informal forms of international cooperation. International actors are weaving intricate transgovernmental networks (TGNs), permeating and penetrating more formal state interactions, as well as creating higher-level informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs). Since 1990 the number of IIGOs has grown dramatically (from 27 to over 140) whereas the number of formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) has increased only slightly (from 320 to 340) before plateauing in the new millennium. 1 Informal networks and institutions do not entail legally binding agreements or bureaucratic structures, such as secretariats or organizational headquarters. Informal commitments are typically "soft" and political in nature, and rely on voluntary implementation. But informal governance nevertheless creates shared and consistent practices that structure ongoing relations among participants. This makes them very different from purely ad hoc policy coordination.Existing accounts explain this phenomenon by focusing on the demand for informal governance. In periods of accelerating global change and high uncertainty, states wish to avoid the sovereignty costs entailed in binding legal obligations and delegation to independent international agents. While these accounts make a persuasive case about the demand for informal arrangements, they have devoted comparatively little attention to factors that have changed the supply conditions for informal governance. This chapter fills that gap by showing that the emergence and adoption of new communication technologies increased the feasibility and lowered the cost of informal governance. This has We thank

The UN High‐Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development: An orchestrator, more or less?

“…At the HLPF, however, the parallel events are neither formally linked nor loosely coupled to the formal proceedings. This is a waste as the literature outlines a particular value in the institutional interplay between formal and informal arrangements (Manulak & Snidal, 2021), whether within or around (in)formal intergovernmental institutions (Westerwinter et al, 2021).…”

“…For example, a task force of five rapporteurs could be asked to harvest innovative ideas and report on them at the beginning of the ministerial segment. The academic literature views potential in such a ‘hierarchy plus network’ mode of governance, where high‐level processes convene the activities of lower level transnational processes (Manulak & Snidal, 2021). In a similar vein, Carayannis and Weiss (2021) call for better collaboration of the intergovernmental ‘first UN’ and civil servants of the ‘second UN’ with supportive non‐state actors of the ‘third UN’, especially when it comes to knowledge brokering, analysis and innovation – deliverables that we see emerging especially from the informal proceedings of the HLPF.…”

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“…For example, the Club de Berne provides a recurrent forum to discuss intelligence and security including coordinating responses to terrorist attacks; the Human Security Network promotes the abolishment of antipersonnel mines; and the Montreux Document Forum establishes good practices for private security companies during armed conflict. States also use IIGOs to orchestrate FIGOs, as the G20 does with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Viola, 2015: 90), and to circumvent FIGOs in favor of direct interaction among national line departments (Manulak & Snidal, 2020).…”

“…Figure 1 showed that the number of IIGOs has been increasing rapidly over the past 40 years. Improved electronic communications starting in the 1980s and 1990s have made informal cooperation more feasible as a means to coordinate states (Manulak & Snidal, 2020). States are increasingly turning to IIGOs as the advantages and the limitations of FIGOs have become more apparent over time (Verdier, 2015).…”

“…4 While the technical and political often interact, high-level IIGO representatives have more political leeway to set policy whereas lowerlevel representatives are more closely bound by instructions from national capitals. For the interaction of political decisions in IIGOs with technical agencies, see Manulak & Snidal (2020). 5 This corrects Vabulas & Snidal (2013) which included 'IIGOs within FIGOs'.…”