The Super-Legality of the Constitution, or, a Federalist Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalism

Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy

“…By implementing such radical change as the flat tax the Eastern European nations are leading the West. And it isn't without precedent, either, ''What had appeared in seventeenth-century England as a rather problematic idea too abstract in theory and radical in its politics to be acted upon, became, in America, the very basis for the establishment of both a new constitutional regime and the legal supremacy of the document that defined its essential features'' (Rakove 1999(Rakove :1946.…”

The formation of a European constitution: an approach from historical-political sociology

“…During the great crisis of imperial authority in the 1760s, courts on occasions appealed simultaneously to the colonial constitution, to notions of natural law, and to concepts of rights in order to criticise, overturn and even declare unconstitutional controversial acts of royal legislation (see Morris, 1940, p. 431;Williams, 1940, p. 126;Bilder, 2004, pp. In the first decade of state constitution writing after independence, then, judicial bodies continued to assume distinctive prominence as institutions that were equipped, during a period marked by extremely contested institutional legitimacy and juridical exceptionalism (Rakove, 1999(Rakove, , p. 1940, to produce reasonably stable and extracted norms for the creation of interim polities, and to provide normative support for new acts of legislation. 7, 19;Grey, 1978, p. 880).…”

“…By this time, courts had clearly begun to articulate a set of normative principles by which colonial polities were able, albeit very tentatively, to express their legitimacy in independent terms, and constitutionally to construct themselves in relatively autonomous fashion. In the first decade of state constitution writing after independence, then, judicial bodies continued to assume distinctive prominence as institutions that were equipped, during a period marked by extremely contested institutional legitimacy and juridical exceptionalism (Rakove, 1999, p. 1940), to produce reasonably stable and extracted norms for the creation of interim polities, and to provide normative support for new acts of legislation. Notably, a number of the first state constitutions written after 1776 even contained clauses providing for judicial review of new statutes, 21 and they invoked judicial norms as instruments for reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of legislation passed in the first era of tentative polity building after independence.…”

Should We Venerate That Which We Cannot Love? James Madison on Constitutional Imperfection

“…49 but rather his hitherto underappreciated 1785 letter to Caleb Wallace (Madison 1973–77 [hereafter PJM ], 8:350-59). Wallace was a friend from Princeton (Rakove 1999a, 926; Ketcham 2006, 29) who had moved to the Kentucky territory and solicited Madison’s advice on writing a state “in embryo.” Although scholars have treated the letter in solving other problems within Madison’s constitutional thought (Rakove 1996; 1987, 429; 1997, 1056; 1999b, 1946; 2004 8; Kramer 1999, 626; 2006, 738; and Rosen 1999, 67), none has commented on the tension between this letter and No. 49.…”

“…49 is the clearest indication for scholars that Madison did not share Jefferson's belief in constitutional change by appeal to the people. Jack Rakove (1999b), for example, appeals to Federalist No. 49 as a counterweight to Bruce Ackerman's (1984Ackerman's ( , 1991 reading of No.…”