The subject-matter jurisdiction and interpretive competence of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in relation to international humanitarian law

Abstract

wish to thank Noam Lubell, the editorial team of the AHRLJ, particularly Frans Viljoen, and the two anonymous peer reviewers for their very useful comments. All views and errors remain my own. (2020) 20 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL 42 regards some international humanitarian law conventions as having a human rights character, the primary rules of the applicable international humanitarian law obligations must entail an individual right. Whether a given international humanitarian law obligation entails an individual right is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and, in any event, such instances will be rare. As a consequence of the limited circumstances under which the Court can directly apply international humanitarian law, determining the extent to which the Court can rely on the interpretation of international humanitarian law in applying human rights norms remains pertinent. In this regard it is argued that the Court can rely on international humanitarian law in the application of human rights norms on two bases. First, considering the complementary relationship the Court has with the African Commission, the Court can rely on the African Charter's interpretation clause (articles 60 and 61). Second, the Court has an implied power to interpret international humanitarian law in applying human rights treaties, as this power is necessary for the Court to discharge its mandate.