The Study of Electricity Market Monitoring Index System

Zhao, Huiru; Liang, Chao; Qin, Zhiming

doi:10.1109/wmso.2008.27

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

(9 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They also described some commonly used methods for monitoring the electricity market and weakening market power and finally drew conclusions about the approaches in practice and the reasons behind policy differences. Zhao et al (2008) built a monitoring system for helping the regulator make decisions on the market policy and predicting the future market scenarios, which consists of a price forecast mechanism and market simulator. With the system theory of electricity market monitoring as its basis and by using principal component analysis, the study conducts empirical analysis on the operation of the electric power market in California from 2000 to 2007, which proved the practicality and importance of the electricity market monitoring and early warning function.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Internal and External Monitoring Mechanism of the Electricity Market in the Spot Market: From the Perspective of the Evolutionary Game Theory

Jin¹,

Liu²,

Chen³

et al. 2022

Front. Energy Res.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The internal and external monitoring mechanism is a beneficial monitoring mode which is in line with the current national condition, the situation of the power grid, and the construction progress of the power spot market. However, the independence of third-party monitoring agencies cannot be completely guaranteed because of the incomplete management system of China’s electricity market at present. Therefore, the market is prone to power rent-seeking in which third-party monitoring agencies conspire with the market internal monitoring organization. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructed a coordination game model between third-party monitoring agencies and the market internal monitoring organization, as well as an asymmetric coordination game model between the interest group composed of internal and external monitoring agencies and government regulatory authorities. By analyzing the evolutionarily stable strategy of each game participant, the study identified the underlying factors that affect the strategic choices made by internal and external monitoring agencies and government regulatory authorities and then put forward some reasonable suggestions for reducing the probability of third-party monitoring agencies colluding with internal monitoring organizations so that the efficiency of internal and external monitoring mechanisms can be improved.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%