The Structure of Organizational Incentives

Lambert, Richard A.; Larcker, David F.; Weigelt, Keith

doi:10.2307/2393375

Cited by 525 publications

(339 citation statements)

References 27 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

307

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The results are consistent with a set of managerial power model and social comparison theories which predict that pay outcomes are more favorable to manager interests than shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004;Bebchuk and Fried, 2003;Lambert et. al, 1993;Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996;Hambrick, 1988 andWade et.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 84%

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay

Conyon¹

2010

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study investigates the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay using a unique data set of over 200 publicly traded UK firms. We present theoretical arguments that compensation consultants (who are experts in the market for compensation services) promote pay contracts to align managerial and shareholder interests. Empirically we show that CEO pay is greater in firms using large consultants, namely consultants with a greater number of clients. There are other important contingencies. We find that CEO pay is greater in firms whose compensation consultants supply other services to the client firm. We also find CEO pay is greater the higher is the average CEO pay of the consultants other clients. To explain this phenomenon we draw on two other theoretical paradigms --managerial power and social comparison theory. Overall, the evidence provides consistent support for our hypotheses. We argue that the results have important implications for executive pay scholars, as well as for the designers of compensation packages. (JEL G31, G34, M41)

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 84%

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay

Conyon¹

2010

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Crystal (1991) argues that boards of directors over-compensate senior executives because outside directors are hired by the CEO and can be removed by the CEO [5]. Likewise, Lambert et al (1993) and Boyd (1994) find a positive relation between CEO compensation and the percentage of the board composed of outside directors [6] [7]. However, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) conclude that compensation is unrelated to the percentage of outside directors on the board [8].…”

Section: Schools Of Thoughtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, our conjecture is that the relationship between pay and the right hand side variables changed after the crisis. To test this, we estimate Specification (II) which 6 We also tested a specification using market capitalization for firm size (unreported). The results were similar, and the specification with sales has somewhat better fit.…”

Section: 1 J Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of CEO Compensation before and after the Financial Crisis

Sonenshine¹,

Larson²,

Cauvel³

2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper revisits the determinants of CEO compensation using recent data (covering 125 firms from 2003 to 2012). We focus in particular on how CEO pay changed after the 2008 financial crisis. Post-crisis, the composition of pay shifted away from cash toward equity. Furthermore, post-crisis pay is tied more closely to performance and less closely to factors (like firm size) that are more tenuously connected to shareholder value. We also investigate the impact of mergers and divestitures on CEO pay, overall and before and after the crisis. Finally, we consider the role that board composition plays in CEO compensation and find that CEOs take larger post-crisis pay cuts when they have more employees on their boards.

show abstract

“…al., 1988, Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990, Main, and et. al., 1993, Lambert and et. al., 1993, Baker and et.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms: New evidence

Kato

Long

2011

China Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

show abstract

The Structure of Organizational Incentives

Cited by 525 publications

References 27 publications

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay

Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay

Determinants of CEO Compensation before and after the Financial Crisis

Tournaments and managerial incentives in China's listed firms: New evidence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About