The striking similarities between standard, distractor-free, and target-free recognition

Abstract

It is often assumed that observers seek to maximize correct responding during recognition testing by actively adjusting a decision criterion. However, early research by Wallace (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4:441–452, 1978) suggested that recognition rates for studied items remained similar, regardless of whether or not the tests contained distractor items. We extended these findings across three experiments, addressing whether detection rates or observer confidence changed when participants were presented standard tests (targets and distractors) versus “pure-list” tests (lists composed entirely of targets or distractors). Even when observers were made aware of the composition of the pure-list test, the endorsement rates and confidence patterns remained largely similar to those observed during standard testing, suggesting that observers are typically not striving to maximize the likelihood of success across the test. We discuss the implications for decision models that assume a likelihood ratio versus a strength decision axis, as well as the implications for prior findings demonstrating large criterion shifts using target probability manipulations.

Response bias in recognition memory as a cognitive trait

“…Participants' resistance to within-list criterion shifting might be a partial result of inherent bias tendencies that anchor shifting behavior. Similarly, the remarkable unwillingness of participants to exercise appropriate levels of bias even when they are aware that test lists are composed only of targets or lures (J. C. Cox & Dobbins, 2011) might be explained in part by such an anchoring effect. Even when manipulations such as feedback, instructional motivation, and payoffs are successful in moving response bias, such shifts are usually suboptimal (e.g., Aminoff et al, 2012), another potential influence of trait bias.…”

Pupil dilation during recognition memory: Isolating unexpected recognition from judgment uncertainty

“…The early amplitude 'unexpected recognition' effect could therefore reflect the recollection of contextual information, which engenders high certainty of prior encounter and thus is experienced as unexpected or surprising when one expects new materials. Since recollection is usually not triggered by new materials (Cox & Dobbins, 2011;Dobbins, 2014;Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011), this would explain why an analogous pattern doesn't arise when new items are unexpectedly encountered.…”

A dynamic stimulus-driven model of signal detection.

“…One recognition memory paradigm, explored most recently by Cox and Dobbins (2011), takes the relative frequencies of signal or noise stimulus presentations to an extreme. They asked subjects to rate how old probe words felt on a 6-point memory strength scale when test lists consisted of either all old words, all new words, or a standard 50 -50 combination of both.…”