The Strategic Management of Government Affairs in Brussels

Abstract

This article explores the strategic management of government affairs in companies active in the European Union (EU). The article relies on a unique large-N dataset on the functioning and staffing of EU government affairs. The analysis shows that companies delegate government affairs functions to in-house managers with specific competences, who stay in office for long periods and who have an extensive knowledge of the core competences of the company, thanks to their educational background and work experience in the private sector. These findings suggest that how companies strategically manage and staff government affairs in Brussels rests on the distinct structure of business-government relations in the EU, which are based on the exchange of technical information and the establishment of credibility and long run trust arrangements.

Where Are the Revolving Doors in Brussels? Sector Switching and Career Progression in EU Business–Government Affairs

“…Under these unique conditions specific business political capabilities have emerged (Coen and Vannoni 2018). In this paper, we find that there are organizational and individual incentives in government affairs in Brussels which prevent managers from switching sectors.…”

“…In the EU, we have seen the emergence of a distinct business government arrangement, where influence is less about money, political action committees (PACs), political contacts, party and presidential access (LaPira, & Thomas, 2017), but rather an informational exchange based on technical expertise, credibility, and long-run reputation building (Coen, 1997, 1999). Under these unique conditions, specific business political capabilities have emerged (Coen & Vannoni, 2018). In this article, we find that there are organizational and individual incentives in government affairs in Brussels which prevent managers from switching sectors.…”

“…In so doing, we implicitly draw a comparison between these two polities. Although there are some similarities, such as the presence of a strong supranational level drawing actors to the center, in this work we seek to test whether different political institutions and in turn different business and government dynamics (Coen & Vannoni, 2018) lead to different dynamics for sector switching and career progression. US scholars posit that switching take place because business and government relations are driven by the importance of personal contacts (Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2011;Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012;Cain & Drutman, 2014;LaPira & Thomas, 2014;Lazarus, McKay, & Herbel, 2016;Lazarus & McKay, 2012).…”

“…Business and government relations in the EU are rather different and lead to different individual and organizational incentives with respect to sector switching. As for the organizational incentives, in the EU companies provide the public authority with technical expertise, in exchange of access to policy making (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Coen, 2007; Coen & Vannoni, 2016, 2018). Moreover, the political environment is less polarized and competitive than the American one (LaPira & Thomas, 2017; Mahoney, 2008).…”

Corporate political strategies in Europe: The determinants of firms' access to the European Commission

“…According to Coen and Vannoni (2018), outside lobbyists are limited to helping firms build a trusting relationship with policymakers, thus, playing a complementary role to the in-house lobbyists in the EU lobbying process. They also conclude that this EU expertise-based lobbying may influence the organizational design of the government affairs departments of politically active companies.…”