The platform will undergo maintenance on Sep 14 at about 7:45 AM EST and will be unavailable for approximately 2 hours.
1996
DOI: 10.1016/s0378-4266(96)00004-0
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The stock-market reaction to dividend cuts and omissions by commercial banks

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
58
4

Year Published

2000
2000
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
9
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 94 publications
(64 citation statements)
references
References 33 publications
2
58
4
Order By: Relevance
“…In addition to the basic areas affecting financial distress, dividend changes have also long been viewed as a signal of both current and expected future firm prospects. Dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities and this is consistent with the findings of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013), Bessler and Nohel (1996), and Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 84%
“…In addition to the basic areas affecting financial distress, dividend changes have also long been viewed as a signal of both current and expected future firm prospects. Dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities and this is consistent with the findings of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013), Bessler and Nohel (1996), and Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 84%
“…Dividends are generally stable and increases or decreases are typically interpreted as signals of long-run changes in firm profitability. Reductions in dividends are generally associated with a negative stock price reaction, since they can be seen a signal of lower future profits (Ghosh and Woolridge 1998, Denis et al 1994, Bessler and Nohel 1996, 2000. During the financial crisis, concern about negative signals from a dividend cut may have been heightened, given the uncertainty and lack of [2] transparency about growing losses at individual financial firms.…”
Section: These Measures Include Basel Iii's Capital Conservation Buffmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Likewise, if regulators 'force' a bank to change its dividend policy, this will inevitably communicate private information to shareholders and depositors about the bank's solvency status. Bessler and Nohel (1996) argue that this multidimensional aspect of the asymmetric information problem faced by banks, customers, and shareholders is an important factor in arguing that dividend policy of the banks are different from non-financial firms. Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggested that dividends might convey information about firms' future earnings if management pursued a policy of dividend stabilisation, and used changes in the dividends payout to signal a change in their views about the firms' future profitability.…”
Section: Agency Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%