The state’s estate: Devaluing and revaluing ‘surplus’ public land in Canada

Abstract

Since the mid-1990s, Canadian public real property (land, buildings, and equipment) has been subject to regular scrutiny through bureaucratic procedures aimed at ridding the state’s estate of all ‘surplus’ properties. Surplus is transferred to Canada Lands Company, a state owned enterprise charged with privatizing public land. Bureaucratic devaluation thus allows for subsequent revaluation through multiple forms of state-sponsored remediation: the physical, legal, and financial manipulation of public property by Canada Lands Company. Analyzing Canada Lands Company’s history, role, budgets, and activities, this article uncovers the particular dynamics of how Canadian public land is being privatized through devaluation and revaluation by the state. Two arguments of broader significance for literatures on the political economy of the state and public land frame the discussion: (1) Canada Lands Company’s activities speak to the important managerial role played by the (Canadian) state in the land dispossession process; and (2) Canada Lands Company’s treatment of surplus public land as a financial asset is a distinguishing feature of the Canadian public property management system, setting it apart from elsewhere.

Shifting Agendas: Private Consultants and Public Planning Policy

“…The self-financing structure for Downsview was a condition of the federal government, requiring parcels of land to be developed or sold to pay for the creation and operation of the park (Young and Ircha 2013). This is in line with how the CLC has operated in other jurisdictions, with proceeds from land sales and rental revenue financing the agency’s operations (Whiteside 2017). Arguably, the risk that the private-sector would normally be exposed to is undertaken by a government agency (such as from remediating contaminated lands, or failed rezoning, in the case of Downsview) (Whiteside 2017).…”

“…This is in line with how the CLC has operated in other jurisdictions, with proceeds from land sales and rental revenue financing the agency’s operations (Whiteside 2017). Arguably, the risk that the private-sector would normally be exposed to is undertaken by a government agency (such as from remediating contaminated lands, or failed rezoning, in the case of Downsview) (Whiteside 2017). While this requirement restricted the range of options, within this framework, there was still considerable shifting in the alternatives presented, as discussed below, and the guidance provided.…”

“…11 There is the argument that with the goal to maximize the value of lands and financial returns (Young and Ircha 2013), CLC functions only nominally as a public agency. As Whiteside (2017) notes, the value of these surplus lands is largely determined by their exchange value, not their public value, with CLC actively intervening to shift market conditions, and decision making removed from democratic processes. This can be partially seen in the conflicts between federal and municipal actors, with potentially incompatible goals maximizing the government’s financial return (for CLC/PDP) and local authorities attempting to gain assets for public use (Young and Ircha 2013).…”

“…However, as PDP was reliant on private developers to undertake the residential and commercial redevelopment, they ultimately worked within the municipal processes to rezone lands prior to sale. Despite this, CLC can also been seen as transcending traditional distinctions between public and private, functioning “as Crown corporation, as public landowner, as commercial decision-maker and as market maker” (Whiteside 2017, p. 18). The self-financing structure for Downsview was a condition of the federal government, requiring parcels of land to be developed or sold to pay for the creation and operation of the park (Young and Ircha 2013).…”

Four types of urban austerity: Public land privatisations in French and Italian cities

“…Public land austerity policies are part of deeper processes of neoliberal state reforms (Christophers, 2017; Whiteside, 2019). Shaped by new public management principles (Hood, 1998) and justified in the name of public debt reduction, these policies fundamentally change how public property is understood and managed – and sometimes redeveloped – by public authorities.…”